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Security threats caused by the inappropriate actions of the user continue to be a 
significant security problem within any organization.  The purpose of this study was to 
continue the efforts of Katz by assessing the security behavior and practices of working 
professionals.  Katz conducted a study that assessed whether the faculty and staff at 
Armstrong Atlantic State University had been performing the simple everyday practices 
and behavior necessary to avert insider threats to information security.  Critical in 
understanding human behavior is in knowing how behavior varies across different groups 
or demographics.  Because a user’s behavior can be influenced by demographic groups, 
this study adapted Katz’s study by examining the influence on the security behavior of 
four demographic groups identified by gender, age, education, and occupation.  Like 
Katz, this study used a 5-point Likert scale quantitative self-administered, closed-ended 
questionnaire to assess the participants’ security practices and behaviors.  The 
questionnaire was developed in two sections: Section 1 used a binary scale to gather the 
participants’ demographics data while Section 2 used a 5-point Likert scale to measure 
the participants’ security behaviors.  The sample population was derived from working 
professionals at the General Dynamic and Program Manager Advanced Amphibious 
Assault (GD & PM AAA) Facility in Woodbridge, Virginia.  The total population at PM 
AAA Office was 288, of which 87 or 30% completed the survey.  Results of the 
demographic survey indicate that (a) women were more security aware than their male 
counterparts, (b) younger participants were more security aware than their older 
counterparts, (c) participants who did not attend college were more security aware than 
their college-educated counterparts, and (d) participants in nontechnical positions were 
more security aware than their counterparts in technical positions.  The results indicate 
that a relation exists between the participants’ security behaviors and their levels of 
security awareness. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Statement of the Problem Investigated and Goal that Was Achieved  
Security threats caused by a user’s inappropriate action continue to be a significant 
security problem within any organization (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & 
Kovacich, 2006).  These security threats are difficult to detect because they originate 
within a network or organization (Carroll, 2006).  Inappropriate actions are defined as the 
actions performed by a user (e.g., downloading unauthorized software, reconfiguring a 
computer’s security settings, disabling a firewall, providing personal information, or the 
disclosure of passwords) that can affect a system’s security settings or generate a security 
breach (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Carroll, 2006).  The intent of this study was to 
determine whether the individual user is using proper security behavior and practices 
necessary to avert inappropriate actions that lead to internal security threats.  To better 
understand the inappropriate actions by a user (e.g., reconfiguring the security setting or 
disclosing a password), the author examined the relation between users’ security 
behaviors and their awareness levels. 
Defending against security threats resulting from the poor judgment or inappropriate 
actions of a user has traditionally been the responsibility of the network administrator and 
security personnel.  In the 1990s, the interconnection of multiple networks (which until 
then were somewhat isolated) and the proliferation of cyber attacks shifted the security 
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community focus from system to network security (Arce, 2003).  Besides dealing with a 
proliferation of cyber attacks, security personnel must also deal with extensive web 
browsing, instant messaging, peer-to-peer networks, digital media players, personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), wireless devices, and a host of software applications that 
interact directly and indirectly with internal networks and the Internet (Arce, 2003; Arce, 
2004; Crossler & Belanger, 2006).  In addition, the constant changes to newer 
technologies is also making it more difficult for even the most dedicated of security 
professionals to gain and maintain the knowledge and skills needed to allow them to 
carry out their security tasks effectively (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  As a result, network 
administrators and security professionals continue to be in a state of constantly reacting 
to the latest technical changes and cyber attacks (Raghavan, Sakaguchi, & Mahaney, 
2008).  Consequently, responsibility for the security or information assurance of an 
information system has shifted from the organization’s security personnel to the system 
user, who is perhaps the least trained or experienced in security matters within an 
organization (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Arce, 2003).  This shift in responsibilities 
introduces a new set of security problems; specifically, the inappropriate actions of users, 
such as disabling a firewall, providing personal information, or the disclosure of 
passwords, are generating security breaches that can affect the entire organization. 
To compound the security situation, users are also being targeted by hackers who are 
using social engineering attack techniques to influence the user to perform inappropriate 
actions that can generate security breaches.  Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Internet 
Security stated that ―amateurs hack systems, while professionals hack people‖ (Tucker, 
2002, p. 10).  Social engineering is the practice of using deception or persuasion to obtain 
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goods and information fraudulently (Twitchell, 2006).  Some hackers also use a 
combination of social engineering with phishing schemes that use spoofed e-mails to lure 
users to fake websites designed to capture sensitive information or to load a virus that can 
create security breaches onto the workstation (Ohaya, 2006).  These security breaches 
may allow unauthorized access from potentially anywhere in the world and corruption of 
data without physical access (Dark, Harter, Morales, & Garcia, 2008).  Renowned hacker 
Kevin Mitnick indicated that, for him, resorting to a technical attack was rare because the 
use of social engineering was quicker and often more successful (Twitchell, 2006). 
To mitigate the impact of social engineering attacks, private, academic, and federal 
organizations must set ground rules for user behavior through security training combined 
with security policies (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Ohaya, 2006).  To 
mitigate the impact of inappropriate actions, all organizations must provide individuals 
with security training in the knowledge and skills needed to be able to recognize and 
know how to prevent inappropriate actions (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; 
Ohaya, 2006).  Today, private and federal organizations are using online information 
assurance electronic training (e-training) to increase the security awareness of their 
employees concerning the dangers of inappropriate actions (Ramim & Levy, 2006).  This 
online security e-training is intended to provide individuals with the skills needed to 
recognize inappropriate actions and the knowledge of what they should do when 
confronted with security threats (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). 
Current articles on the security behavior and practices of the user have failed to 
consider how the user views security (Gross & Rosson, 2007a).  Most information 
security research has focused on such technical issues as access to information systems 
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and secure communications (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).  Furthermore, research 
articles and conferences have focused largely on human memory, attitudes, and behaviors 
that are applicable to technical issues (Bishop & Frincke, 2005; Conti & Sobiesk, 2007; 
Kostakos & O’Neill, 2008).  Research regarding user security behavior includes the 
following: 
 Surveying professionals to analyze their perspectives on security management 
(Gross & Rosson, 2007a); 
 Surveying users via an Internet survey provider to assess their ability to 
differentiate between privacy and security problems (Gross & Rosson, 2007b); 
 Surveys of Information Technology (IT) students, faculty, and staff in an 
academic environment on their information security behaviors and practices 
(Katz, 2005; North, George, & North, 2006, 2007; Reeder & Arshad, 2005); and 
 A study that focused on the behavior and practices of security personnel at 
various private organizations (Suchan, 2003). 
Before security threats resulting from users’ poor judgment or inappropriate actions can 
be resolved, a baseline of the individual user security behaviors and practices must be 
determined. 
The goal for this study was to measure users’ information security behavior and 
practices and to determine the information security awareness levels of users.  Doing so 
was accomplished by using a quantitative survey instrument that measured users’ security 
behaviors and practices according to demographic groups.  The sample population for 
this survey was from the Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA) 
Office of the General Dynamics (GD & PM AAA) Facility in Woodbridge, Virginia.  
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The data collected were analyzed to determine the users’ levels of information security 
awareness. 
 
Relevance, Significance, or Need for the Study  
Threats to information security are continuously growing and vary from organization 
to organization, but the one threat that remains the same, regardless of the type of 
organization, is the insider threat (Carroll, 2006), which, resulting from poor judgment or 
inappropriate actions by a user, continues to be a significant security problem within all 
types of organizations (Aytes & Connolly, 2004; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Stoll, 
Tashman, Edwards, & Spafford, 2008).  Security threats, such as downloading 
unauthorized software, reconfiguring security settings, or disclosing passwords, can make 
a system vulnerable to attack, resulting in data manipulation, modification, destruction, 
and theft (Doherty & Fulford, 2005).  Such insider security threats are well documented 
(e.g., Arce, 2003; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Ramim & Levy, 2006).  However, additional 
research on approaches that potentially reduce or eliminate threats and intrusions remains 
necessary (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford, 2007). 
In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) established the nation’s initial 
goal for information assurance and a cooperative framework between industry, academia, 
and local and national governments to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure systems 
(Herrmann, 2002).  Therefore, organizations are using information assurance to protect 
their critical infrastructure systems.  Information assurance is a security technique that 
encompasses a defense-in-depth strategy composed of three components: technology, 
operations, and people (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  In the 
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past, the security community relied solely on technology to provide fast solutions to 
security breaches (John, Maurer, & Tessem, 2005; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).  
However, people are part of the system, and failure to recognize this fact and address the 
training of users can result in disaster (Bishop & Frincke, 2005; Katz, 2005).  Until the 
security community addresses the people component, comprehensive security strategies 
cannot be developed (Arce, 2003; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  Thus, determining whether 
users are engaging in proper information security behavior and practices is necessary, and 
if they are not, appropriate recommendations to correct any flaws in their behaviors and 
practices should be made. 
The significance of this study lies in its assessing user security behaviors and 
practices.  The results of this study provide security personnel in the private, academic, 
and government community with an information-assurance baseline for security 
behaviors and practices of users.  Results of this study also can provide organizations 
with snapshots of the current state of their employees’ security behaviors and a basis for 
future research. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
One of the barriers to establishing sound user security behaviors and practices is the 
mindset of the security community and researchers (Hazari, 2005).  User security 
behavior has received little attention from researchers because information security is 
considered a technical discipline, with much of the attention being focused on such topics 
as access control, password protection, data protection, and encryption (Hazari, 2005; 
Katz, 2005; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).  Another barrier is the mindset of senior 
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managers who fail to see information security as a ―value added‖ contribution to the 
organization’s ―bottom line‖ (Jahankhani, Fernando, Nkhoma, & Mouratidis, 2007).  In 
fact, computer crimes often go unreported because managers and organizations are not 
willing to risk public embarrassment or bad publicity (Hazari, 2005; Kshetri, 2006). 
Earlier studies on such demographics as age and gender in terms of how they 
impacted computer usage may no longer be accurate (Knight & Pearson, 2005).  Knight 
and Pearson stated that changing demographics in the workplace and their effect on the 
organizations (e.g., the increase in the number of women and age) should be reexamined.  
In addition, the constant upgrades to newer technologies and changes in security (e.g., 
upgrades, patches, and applications) make information security an ever-changing and 
fast-moving environment (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  These ongoing 
technology upgrades may frustrate users and security personnel who have to keep up with 
all the changes.  This fluid security environment may cause the user to become either 
apathetic or hostile towards security (Gross & Rosson, 2007a; West, 2008). 
One issue for this study is the reluctance or lack of responsiveness of individuals to 
participate in surveys and studies (Creswell, 2003; Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 2000; 
Nardi, 2003).  This reluctance to participate arises from participants’ tending to (a) 
distrust surveys, especially when the surveys address topics the participants are not as 
knowledgeable in as they should be; (b) be uneasy in acknowledging and sharing bad 
practices; and (c) be apprehensive as to who will see the results of the survey (Reeder & 
Arshad, 2005; Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2005). 
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Research Question Investigated 
The purpose of this study was to use a quantitative, closed-ended, survey instrument 
to measure users’ security behavior according to different demographics.  The users’ 
behavior data were then analyzed to determine users’ levels of security awareness.  
Measuring behavior is normally accomplished through the use of a questionnaire (Nardi, 
2003; Singh, Cabraal, Demosthenous, Astbrink, & Furlong, 2007).  The variables for this 
study include an independent variable—the security behavior of a user—and a dependent 
variable—the security awareness level of a user.  The demographics for this study include 
age, gender, education, and occupation and provide a framework to answer the following 
questions: 
 Are female users more security aware? 
 Are users age 40 and over more security aware? 
 Are users with higher levels of education more security aware? 
 Are users in technical positions more security aware? 
The intent of this study was to answer the following research question: 
 Is there a relation between users’ security behaviors and their levels of security 
awareness? 
 
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
A limitation (restriction) that may affect this study but is beyond the control of the 
researcher was the participants’ responses to the survey.  Past research has indicated that 
even trained security personnel are resistant in providing any information regarding their 
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information security behaviors and practices (Katz, 2005).  The delimitations for this 
study, those elements within the control of the researcher, include the following: 
 The study was conducted with one sample population in Virginia. 
 Participants’ access to the survey was via a secure intranet. 
 
Definition of Terms 
Key terms used throughout this dissertation are identified and defined below. 
Cyber attack – This term denotes illegal activities or a crime that takes place on an 
information system, such as theft of software, data, unauthorized access, or modification 
of information (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). 
Hacker – A hacker is a person who uses and creates computer software for 
enjoyment or to gain access to information illegally (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). 
Hacking – Hacking is the act of gaining access to a computer illegally (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2003). 
Identity theft – Identity theft is a crime in which one person masquerades under the 
identity of another (Campbell, Calvert & Boswell, 2003). 
Information assurance (IA) – Information assurance is an information security 
technique that protects and defends information and automated systems by ensuring their 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and nonrepudiation and includes the 
restoration of information and systems by incorporating protection, detection, and 
reaction capabilities (Herrmann, 2002). 
Information security – Information security refers to protection of information 
systems against unauthorized access, transfer, destruction, or modification of 
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information, whether accidental or intentional, in a storage, processing, or transit state 
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). 
Infrastructure system – This term refers to a network of independent, largely 
privately owned, automated systems and processes that function collaboratively and 
synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and 
services (Hermann, 2002). 
Internet – The Internet is a complex, diverse, wide area network (WAN) that 
connects local area networks (LANs) and individual users around the globe (Dean, 2003). 
Phishing – Phishing is a cyber attack that mimics a legitimate or trusted website to 
convince victims to disclose their user ids, passwords, or personal information; it is also 
being used in conjunction with social engineering attacks (Levy, 2004; McDowell, 2006). 
Security awareness – Security awareness occurs when a user understands the 
security policies, procedures, and practices in order to make sound judgments when a 
potential security issue occurs in the absence of guidance (Boyce & Jennings, 2002). 
Security education training and awareness - This process instructs users in their 
responsibility to uphold the organization’s information system and security policies, 
procedures, and practices (Boyce & Jennings, 2002). 
Social engineering – Social engineering refers to an attack technique used to target 
the individual, with the aim of stealing personal or corporate information; its action can 
be as simple as asking the victim for information or can be combined with a phishing 
cyber attack (e.g., an e-mail that promises new application features under a free trial 
basis) in order to steal the user’s name, password, or other personal information (Mitnick 
& Simon, 2002). 
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Spyware – Spyware is an ad-based program that arrives through e-mail, enticing the 
user to install or link to free software.  Spyware can also arrive via instant messaging, 
popular downloads, online gaming, and porn sites.  Spyware is designed to track what the 
user does, where the user goes, and what information the user transmits, which is sent 
back to the hacker (McDowell, 2006). 
Threat – A threat is the potential danger that a vulnerability may be exploited 
intentionally, triggered accidentally, or otherwise activated (Herrmann, 2002). 
User – This term refers to any individual or employee who uses an information 
system (computer) locally or across the Internet for business or personal use (Blyth & 
Kovacich, 2006; Boyce & Jennings, 2002). 
Vulnerability – A vulnerability is a weakness in a system that can be exploited to 
violate the system’s intended behavior relative to safety, security, reliability, availability 
and integrity or to obtain access to some asset (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004). 
 
Summary 
Today’s network administrators and security personnel are being overworked.  In 
addition to their day-to-day operations, they must also deal with rising Internet usage, 
escalating software upgrades, rapid introduction of new technologies, and increasing 
numbers of cyber attacks (Arce, 2003; Arce, 2004; Crossler & Belanger, 2006; Raghavan 
et al., 2008).  Consequently, responsibility for a system’s information assurance has 
shifted to the user, who is considered the least trained or experienced in security matters 
(Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Arce, 2003).  This shift of responsibility is introducing a 
new set of security problems, specifically, the inappropriate actions of the user.  Security 
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threats due to the poor judgment or inappropriate actions of users (e.g., reconfiguring 
security settings or disclosing passwords) continue to be a significant security problem 
within any organization (Aytes & Connolly, 2004; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Stoll et al., 
2008).  These security threats have the potential to cause great loss to the organization 
and the user in the forms of data manipulation, modification, destruction, or theft 
(Doherty & Fulford, 2005).  Because these security threats are well documented (e.g., 
Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Knapp et al., 2007), there is a pressing need for more research 
that can highlight strategies or approaches that might reduce these threats. 
However, existing work on user security practice has failed to consider how users 
view security (Gross & Rosson, 2007a).  Most information security research has focused 
on such technical issues as access to information systems and secure communications 
(Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007), but many nontechnical articles present themes that 
are directly applicable to technical issues (Bishop & Frincke, 2005).  As Kostakos and 
O’Neill (2008) indicated, traditional human computer interaction (HCI) literature has 
considered human-in-the-loop security issues as a design problem in need of appropriate 
interfaces, interactions, and policies.  Furthermore, Bishop and Frincke (2005) stated that, 
without understanding something about how people interact with security, it is easy to 
blame users for security breaches.  Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether users 
are engaging in proper information security behaviors and practices and, if not, to make 
appropriate recommendations to correct any flaws in their behaviors and practices.  
Before these inappropriate actions can be resolved, an initial baseline of the common user 
security behaviors and practices must be determined.  The goal of this study was to 
continue the efforts by Katz (2005) in assessing user information-security behaviors and 
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practices in order to determine the information-security awareness level of users in an 
organization, specifically according to demographic group. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Review of the Literature 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the published research in the area of information 
security and, specifically, on the behaviors and practices of individual users.  After a 
section addressing the background information, the main topics include insider security 
threats, user behavior, and security awareness and training.  The chapter concludes with a 
summary of what is known and unknown in research literature, the contribution of this 
study, and a chapter summary. 
 
Background 
Threats can be classified into three broad categories: natural, internal, and external 
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  The natural threat is, as the name implies, any natural 
disaster—such as fire, flood, power failure, earthquake, and mudslide—that can cause 
damage or loss of data to a system.  The internal or insider threat occurs when a party or 
person knowingly or unknowingly causes damage or loss of data to a system (Blyth & 
Kovacich, 2006).  The external threat is the more familiar threat and includes a hacker 
trying to gain access to a system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Carroll, 2006).  Defending 
against these security threats has traditionally been the responsibility of the network 
administrator and the security personnel.  Today, these network administrators and 
security professionals are being overworked (Raghavan et al., 2008).  Besides having to 
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maintain their current network’s security, personnel must also deal with extensive web 
browsing, instant messaging, peer-to-peer networks, digital media players, personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), wireless devices, a host of software applications that interact 
directly and indirectly with internal networks and the Internet, unknown software flaws 
that can create security threats, and a proliferation of cyber attacks (Arce, 2003).   
In addition to this increased workload, the continuing escalation of newer 
technologies and security tools is also making it more difficult for even the most 
dedicated of security professionals to gain and maintain the knowledge and skills needed 
to allow them to effectively carry out their security tasks (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Blyth & 
Kovacich, 2006).  Because security risks can change as quickly as new threats, 
vulnerabilities, and attack tools are introduced, security must now be designed as a 
continuous process that reacts quickly to changes (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Raghavan et al., 
2008).  All these security issues, in conjunction with an existing acute shortage of 
administrators and security personnel, are compelling organizations to shift the 
responsibility of information system security to the user, who is perhaps the least trained 
or experienced in security matters (Arce, 2003).  This shift in responsibilities is exposing 
the organization to the possibility of increased insider security threats and, specifically, to 
the inappropriate actions of users (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 
2006). 
 
Insider Security Threats  
Threats to information security are always increasing and vary from organization to 
organization, but the one threat that remains the same regardless of the type of 
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organization is the insider threat (Carroll, 2006).  Insider security threats may not occur 
as frequently as external attacks, but they have a higher rate of success, can go undetected 
and pose a greater risk than an external attack (Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo, & Upadhyaya, 
2005).  Insider threats can be classified into two categories: the intentional and the 
unintentional threat (Carroll, 2006).  The intentional threat occurs when a party or trusted 
person within the organization knowingly sets out to cause damage or loss of data to a 
system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  The intentional threat can be anything from an 
employee creating a security risk for malicious reasons or personal gain to the more 
familiar threat of a hacker trying to gain access to a system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; 
Carroll, 2006).  The intentional threat is a more serious threat to information security in 
that hackers and criminals have learned to manipulate users into divulging confidential 
information with a technique called social engineering (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).  As 
Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Internet Security stated, ―[A]mateurs hack systems, while 
professionals hack people‖ (Tucker, 2002, p. 10).  Renowned hacker Kevin Mitnick 
indicated that, for him, resorting to a technical attack was rare because the use of social 
engineering was quicker and often more successful (Twitchell, 2006).  
Trust plays a key role in the user’s decision-making process (Tsai & Egelman, 2006).  
Trustworthy users can fail to be trustworthy when it comes to protecting their systems 
due to inadequate education, negligence, and various social pressures (Orgill, Romney, 
Bailey, & Orgill, 2004).  Furthermore, the trust that people put in websites has enabled 
hackers to easily deceive people at all levels of income and education (MacInnes, 
Musgrave, & Laska, 2005).  Social engineering attacks exploit the user’s trust by 
influencing the user to perform inappropriate actions so that information can be stolen or 
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security breaches can be generated (Orgill et al., 2004; Twitchell, 2006).  Some hackers 
also use a combination of social engineering with phishing attacks that use spoofed e-
mails to lure users to fake websites designed to capture sensitive information or to load a 
virus onto the workstation, thereby creating security breaches (Kumaraguru et al., 2007; 
Ohaya, 2006).  These security breaches may allow unauthorized access from potentially 
anywhere in the world and corruption of data without physical access (Dark et al., 2008).  
Studies have indicated that a large number of people fall for these phishing attacks even 
when the participants are made aware that their ability to identify phishing attacks is 
being tested (Kumaraguru et al., 2007).  Many of these phishing attacks were not even 
detected; therefore, things may be worse than reported because attackers are often able to 
hide their tracks by disabling logging facilities or modifying event logs so their activity 
goes undetected (Kemmerer, 2003).  To mitigate the impact from social engineering 
attacks, organizations must set ground rules for user behaviors through the use of security 
training combined with security policies (Al-Hamdani, 2006; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; 
Ohaya, 2006). 
The unintentional threat occurs when a trusted person within the organization causes 
damage or loss of data or service without direct intent (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  
Unintentional threats can be caused by anything from leaving a laptop or sensitive 
document unattended, to inadvertently installing software with an unknown flaw or bug 
that can create a security risk (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  
Other unintentional threats from due to users’ poor judgment include opening e-mail 
attachments without checking for viruses, downloading unauthorized software, 
reconfiguring the system security setting, disabling a firewall to access an unauthorized 
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website, and providing personal information or a password to a coworker (Blyth & 
Kovacich, 2006; Carroll, 2006).  As more users become responsible for their own system 
security, the number of unintentional security threats will increase (Chinchani et al., 
2005).  Because organizations have their information infrastructure connected, the 
unintentional threat by one user can lead to a security breach affecting the entire 
infrastructure (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).  These security breaches have the potential to 
generate great loss for the organization and the user in the form of data manipulation, 
modification, destruction, or theft (Chinchani et al., 2005; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; 
Gross & Rosson, 2007a).  Carroll (2006) stated that the unintentional compromise of 
information by an insider can be a product of a lack of security awareness or a failure to 
adhere to security policies.  To overcome these unintentional threats, the security 
community must understand the mindset or behavior of the user in order to develop 
appropriate security countermeasures (Conti & Sobiesk, 2007; Vatsa, Sural, & 
Majumdar, 2007).  These insider threats are creating a pressing need for more research 
that can highlight strategies or approaches that might reduce the insider threat (Doherty & 
Fulford, 2005; Knapp et al., 2007). 
In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) established the nation’s initial 
goal for information assurance and a cooperative framework for industry, academia, and 
local and national governments to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure systems 
(Herrmann, 2002).  Therefore, organizations are using information assurance to protect 
their critical infrastructure systems.  Information assurance is an information security 
technique that encompasses a defense-in-depth strategy composed of three components: 
technology, operations, and people (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 
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2006).  These components form the foundation and framework for developing a 
comprehensive security strategy (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). 
In the past, the majority of security threats were external and could be prevented or 
solved by using technical solutions such as firewalls and antivirus software (Arce, 2003).  
Current technical solutions are using mathematical approaches that include biometrical 
authentication, virtual private networks, and cryptographic techniques (Siponen & Oinas-
Kukkonen, 2007).  Detecting the insider threat, however, is more difficult because there 
is no way to monitor a person’s actions or intent (Carroll, 2006).  Most attempts in 
preventing insider threats involve (a) technical solutions such as firewall logs, intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), and honeypots or (b) security policies such as procedures that 
govern the actions and behavior of personnel within an organization (Carroll, 2006; 
Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Stahl, 2004).  Technical solution such as honeypots can be 
designed to detect, identify, and confirm insider threats (Spitzner, 2003).  Restraints on 
these technical solutions include the insider threat bypassing or introducing bogus or false 
information to mislead security personnel (Spitzner, 2003).  On the other hand, restraints 
in implementing security policies include (a) cost—implementing policies takes time and 
money that are usually unbudgeted—, (b) organizational priorities—ongoing projects 
cannot be interrupted for the sake of imposing standards—, (c) policy age—policies 
should be updated regularly to reflect current technologies and security situation—, and 
(d) enforcement—policies by themselves are not very useful if not enforced (Carroll, 
2006; Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Moore, 2004; Stefanek, 2002).  Understanding users’ 
behavior in security decision making is an avenue that may improve training in user-
security behavior (West, 2008). 
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User Behavior 
Insecure behavior by individual users is now considered one of the major chinks in 
the armor of computer-security countermeasures (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).  Carroll 
(2006) indicated that personnel are among the biggest threats to the information security 
of an organization.  In addition, Bishop and Frincke (2005) stated that, ultimately, 
information security is more about people than computers and information.  Thus, 
security solutions that fail to take human nature into account are doomed (Bishop & 
Frincke, 2005).  However, very little is known about why users choose to engage in 
unsafe security behavior (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).  Two reasons for why proper 
security behavior is difficult to achieve include the mindset of the user and management.  
User mindset includes (a) user attitude—that is, inappropriate actions continue because 
many users, despite having little to no formal training in computer security, feel relatively 
comfortable in their ability to protect themselves from viruses, computer crashes, and 
password violations (West, 2008)—, (b) security risk—that is, many users believe that 
they are not at risk because they generally do not understand security risk: The 
components of security risk such as threats, vulnerabilities, and the value of information 
are poorly understood and are often misjudged (West, 2008)—, (c) lack of motivation—
most users are either intimidated by the very concept of networking or they simply do not 
care enough about the topic to actively learn (West, 2008)—, (d) user priorities—users 
are usually busy with their assignments with little time for security training, so they resist 
such training (Tucker, 2002)—, and (e) user indifference—that is, users who simply 
refuse to comply with an organization’s information security policies and procedures can 
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frustrate the security manager who spent the time in creating these policies and 
procedures (Tucker, 2002). 
Management mindset includes management resources, cost of security, and security 
priorities.  In terms of management resources, despite increased security threats, 
organizations traditionally allocate very little of the IT budget to information security.  In 
fact, the average amount of money as a percentage of revenue spent on security is 
0.0025%, or slightly less than what is spent on coffee (Hazari, 2005).  Furthermore, 
because security costs time and money, business managers often forgo security in order 
to implement a system or service that is faster and cheaper (Stefanek, 2002).  In terms of 
security priorities and support, network administrators often have limited resources, 
making user security training the first casualty as departments trim projects (Tucker, 
2002).  In addition, shrinking IT budgets are forcing IT directors to reduce staff by 
eliminating the more expensive qualified employees and replacing them with less 
expensive untrained or unqualified employees, at the risk of leaving security training to 
unqualified or untrained personnel (Stefanek, 2002).  Moreover, IT managers often 
struggle with getting fellow department managers to provide time for employees to 
receive security training (Stefanek, 2002).  Finally, IT managers have come to depend on 
technology to solve their security problems.  However, they might have difficulty 
justifying new security equipment, such as firewalls or intrusion detection devices, if user 
security training increases security (Paulson, 2002).  
Because people are part of the system, failure to recognize and address the security 
aspects of the end user can result in disaster (Bishop & Frincke, 2005; Katz, 2005).  
Security risks associated with human behavior include the following: 
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 Social engineering—a hacking technique that exploits human trust or ignorance in 
order to obtain information or gain access to information (Dean, 2003; Tucker, 
2002). 
 Misuse of system and network—users consuming valuable computer resources 
such as Internet connectivity or storage space for illegal purposes such as sharing 
MP3 files or games.  In addition to consuming costly resources, this behavior 
potentially exposes systems to security threats and violates laws (Tucker, 2002). 
 Password guessing—users often choose passwords that are easy to guess or crack 
(Dean, 2003; Tucker, 2002). 
 Physical access to bypass controls—users often leave documents and laptops 
unsecured or set up their systems in insecure areas (Dean, 2003; Tucker, 2002). 
 System configuration—users often operate their computers with out-of-date 
antivirus software, fail to install security patches, or open files without checking 
for viruses, worms, and Trojan horses.  These problems pose perhaps the greatest 
security threat to a system (Reeder & Arshad, 2005). 
Although organizations are providing security training for their users, these same 
users continue to disable security settings in order to access unauthorized websites and 
download unauthorized web applications, such as music and video files, behaviors that 
increase the risk of security breaches (Balfanz, Durfee, Smetters, & Grinter, 2004; Cranor 
& Garfinkel, 2004).  Smith (2003) stated that younger users who had grown up with 
computers perceived security as an obstacle they had to work around.  For them, 
information security is often considered inconvenient, not only for the end users, but also 
for the system administrators and application developers as well (West, 2008).  Most 
23 
 
users will often sacrifice security and privacy for convenience while most network 
managers will willingly sacrifice speed for security or vice versa, depending on the 
priority of the user or organization (Jungck & Shim, 2004; Van Dyke, 2007).  Other 
factors that influence user behavior towards security include perceptions, understanding, 
and trust (Gross & Rosson, 2007a).  Cyber attacks such as social engineering can also 
influence user actions (West, 2008). 
How people perceive security risks guides their actions, with most users believing 
that they and their organizations are safe from security threats (Havana & Roning, 2004; 
West, 2008) because a good security program is transparent.  Unless the system crashes, 
there are no indicators that the system is secure (Paulson, 2002; West, 2008).  
Furthermore, if there are no visible threats, most users believe they are not at risk (West, 
2008).  These assumptions create a mindset with both managers and users who believe 
that, if a cyber attack has not yet happened, it is unlikely to happen in the future 
(Stefanek, 2002). 
Although users claim that security and privacy are important to them when online, 
these same users seem to be at ease in disclosing personal information in order to gain 
additional products or services when registering for online accounts (Conti & Sobiesk, 
2007).  These users believe that they are less vulnerable to security risks because they 
have nothing of interest on their system that anyone would want to steal (Havana & 
Roning, 2004; West, 2008).  These inconsistencies between professing privacy concerns 
and engaging in risky behavior while on the Internet may be more a consequence of 
ignorance rather than irrationality (Van Dyke, 2007).  Research has indicated that, despite 
having little to no formal training in computer security, most users feel relatively 
24 
 
comfortable in their ability to protect themselves from viruses, computer crashes, and 
password violations (Aytes & Connolly, 2004; West, 2008).  Users have also been known 
to perform low-level, insecure behavior such as password sharing, creating and using 
weak passwords that can be easily guessed, opening e-mail attachments without checking 
for viruses, and so forth without any attacks on their systems (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).  
Because these actions are not discouraged and, in some cases, are rewarded because they 
are seen as helpful (in cases of sharing passwords) or as saving time by not scanning for 
viruses, they can further encourage inappropriate actions or justify the negative attitude 
towards security (Aytes & Connolly, 2004). 
In an organizational setting, user behavior is also influenced by different levels of 
culture, ranging from professional and organizational levels to the group level.  That is, 
for a specific project, the culture of the project team will dominate the behavior and 
practices of the individual (Karahanna, Evaristo & Srite, 2005).  Other impacts to security 
behavior include users’ limited capacity for information processing and routinely 
performing multiple tasks at once (West, 2008).  As a result, few tasks or decisions 
receive full attention at any given time, and people tend to favor quick decisions based on 
learned rules and heuristics (West, 2008).  Because of this tendency, users often fail to 
recognize security risks because they do not understand the technology or the risks so 
basically believe that they are at less risk than others (Van Dyke, 2007; West, 2008).  The 
average user also faces a dilemma when making security decisions.  That is, users 
generally lack both the motivation and technical knowledge to make informed decisions 
on their own (Ohaya, 2006; Stoll et al., 2008; West, 2008) because they do not have the 
underlying knowledge of how operating systems, e-mail, and websites work (Ohaya, 
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2006).  In addition, the mechanisms for encryption, authentication, and authorization can 
be difficult for the user to understand and use (West, 2008).  Setting up security is still 
much too complicated for the common user (Lampson, 2004).   
Furthermore, studies have indicated that the more complex the security mechanism, 
the less it is used (West, 2008).  For this reason, nonacceptance of security tools is 
recognized as a major problem facing the security community (West, 2008).  As a result, 
improper perceptions about security and poor or even moderate attitudes towards security 
often lead to very poor protection (West, 2008).  The most elegant and intuitively 
designed interface does not improve security if users ignore warnings, choose poor 
settings, or unintentionally subvert corporate policies (West, 2008).  Simply being aware 
of security threats and vulnerabilities and having the knowledge and ability to mitigate 
these security risks does not guarantee any action will be taken by the user (West, 2008).  
Because people’s morals and ethics vary from person to person, relying on the employee 
to do what is right or ethical is never the answer (Carroll, 2006).  To ensure that an 
employee will make the right decision when confronted with a security threat, that 
employee needs to participate in a security education program (Boyce & Jennings, 2002). 
 
Security Awareness and Training 
To counter the security risks posed by inappropriate user action, security 
professionals propose security awareness and training programs for users (Aytes & 
Connolly, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; North et al., 2007).  Awareness programs 
consist of newsletters, posters, flyers, and lectures while training programs are more 
involved and may include case studies and hands-on training (Crossler & Belanger, 
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2006).  The primary goal of security-training programs is to make the user aware of the 
various security risks and how they could affect the organization (Aytes & Connolly, 
2004).  Prior to conducting any security training, an organization security manager must 
assess the organization’s state of security awareness (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  Tucker 
(2002) reported that a simple method for assessing security awareness is for the security 
manager to consider whether a typical employee observing another employee doing 
something that might be inappropriate be able to answer the following three questions: 
 Would this employee know whether the activity was wrong? 
 Would this employee choose to report the misuse of the system? 
 Would this employee know how to report the incident? 
These questions strike at the heart of security awareness.  Users must understand and 
recognize not only unacceptable behavior but also common threats and vulnerabilities 
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Conti & Sobiesk, 2007; Tucker, 2002).  Users must know 
when not to execute a dangerous e-mail attachment or install a software patch, and they 
must know how to take appropriate action when confronted with a threat (Aytes & 
Connolly, 2004). 
A good information security-awareness program is more than simply ensuring that 
everyone knows and obeys the security rules (e.g., rules for user behavior, policies, and 
procedures), it involves providing the reason behind the security rules in order for users 
to make sound security decisions in the absence of specific guidance (Boyce & Jennings, 
2002).  Raising the user level of security awareness will provide that user with the 
knowledge to be able to recognize and prevent inappropriate actions (Al-Hamdani, 2006).  
Security awareness should help curtail inappropriate user behavior, prevent the user from 
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creating system security vulnerabilities, and protect the user from becoming the next 
victim of a cyber attack (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006; Hazari, 2005). 
Besides developing information security awareness programs, organizations must 
continually assess the education and training needs of their users and security personnel 
(Dhillion & Hentea, 2005).  Continuing education and refresher training is very important 
in keeping security personnel and users up-to-date on new applications, current security 
threats, regulations, and policies (Dhillion & Hentea, 2005; Lipinski, Cooper, Cook, & 
Orndorff, 2007).  The biggest hindrance in implementing any security awareness and 
training program is in obtaining the participants’ acceptance (Bradley & Lee, 2007).  
Even if security training is perceived as useful, it will only be accepted if it is also 
perceived as easy to learn and use (Bradley & Lee, 2007).  Unfortunately, these security 
efforts and training programs are designed largely in the absence of reliable knowledge 
about the users’ behavior that this training is seeking to enhance or change (Aytes & 
Connolly, 2004).  Therefore, before these security awareness and training programs can 
be implemented, organizations need to assess the security behavior of individual users.  
In addition, to overcome the inappropriate actions of users, organizations need to 
embrace change related to their current security strategies even though organizations and 
users are renowned for their resistance to change (Ramim & Levy, 2006). 
 
Summary of What Is Known and Unknown in Research Literature 
Current literature on user security has received little attention from security 
researchers because information security is still considered a technical discipline 
(Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).  Kostakos and O’Neill (2008) stated that traditional 
28 
 
HCI literature has considered the human-in-the-loop security issues as a design problem 
in need of appropriate interfaces, interactions, and policies.  However, Bishop and 
Frincke (2005) stated that, without understanding something about how people interact 
with security, it is easy to blame users for security breaches.  Articles on user behaviors 
regarding system security have indicated that individuals are still engaging in 
inappropriate security behavior.  These inappropriate actions include the following: 
security personnel who are security certified tend to violate security procedures 50% 
more than their noncertified counterparts (Suchan, 2003); college students majoring in 
technical curriculums admitted to violating security procedures more than students not 
majoring in technical curriculums (North et al., 2006, 2007); and the faculty and staff at 
Armstrong Atlantic State University performed only minimum security practices to 
safeguard their information, including not using antivirus software, not backing up data, 
not using strong passwords, and not locking their systems when they were left alone 
(Katz, 2005). 
Research on inappropriate user action regarding online protection, especially 
protection against phishing attacks, includes the following.  Reeder and Arshad (2005) 
reported that 75% of the participants still fell victim to a mimicked phishing attack even 
though the researchers provided clues that it was an email scam.  In addition, 
Kumaraguru et al. (2007) reported that participants still fell victim to a phishing attack 
even though they had received training and warnings about such attacks.  Engelman, 
Cranor, and Hong (2008) reported that users heeded security warnings; however, if the 
user did not understand what a phishing attack was, that user would not pay attention to 
the security warning.  Further, Wu, Miller, and Garfinkel (2006) reported that security 
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toolbars failed to prevent users from being spoofed by phishing attacks because users 
failed to respond to security toolbars.  Finally, Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst (2006) 
reported that standard security indicators were not effective for most users. 
Furthermore, research has also been conducted on inappropriate user action regarding 
system authentication.  Sasamoto, Christin, and Hayashi (2008) reported that users failed 
to conceal their actions when authenticating, increasing the risk in becoming a victim to 
shoulder surfing, and Moncur and Leplatre (2007) reported that some participants 
admitted to writing down their passwords or sharing their passwords.  Toomim, Zhang, 
Fogarty, and Landay (2008) investigated shared access control using photo sharing and 
reported that vulnerabilities in guessing the shared password occurred.  Finally, 
Jakobsson, Stolterman, Wetzel, and Yang (2008) proposed a preference-based 
authentication approach with an interactive session to help users remember their 
passwords; however, during testing, an adaptive robot was successful in guessing the 
answers to the questions. 
In investigating the Threat, Awareness, Learning, and Control (TALC) system, which 
draws graffiti on the computer background wallpaper to denote potential vulnerabilities, 
Sankarapandian, Little, and Edwards (2008) reported that four out of seven users felt that 
using TALC had improved their ability to protect their computer.  Furthermore, Stoll et 
al. (2008) reported, concerning a security decision tool called Sesame report, that it 
helped users make better security decisions.  In addition, Herzog and Shahmehri (2007) 
investigated existing user help applications, techniques, and built-in security and reported 
that these applications may still be failures because actual implementation often 
disregarded usability guidelines.  Finally, Gaw, Felten, and Fernandez-Kelly (2006) 
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report that participants felt paranoid when using an encrypted e-mail system and 
indicated that using encrypted e-mail messages was annoying and less efficient than 
sending plain old text e-mails messages. 
 
Contribution of this Study  
The goal of this study was to assess users’ security behaviors in relation to their 
security awareness.  The results of this study provide researchers and security personnel 
in the private, academic, and federal community with the following: 
 A survey instrument to assess the everyday security behaviors and practices of 
working professionals; 
 A demographic baseline on the security behaviors and practices of working 
professionals by gender, age, education, and occupation;  
 An extension to the security behaviors and practices baseline developed by Katz 
(2005), from which further research can be conducted. 
 
Summary 
The decentralization of computers along with rising Internet usage, escalating 
software upgrades, rapid introduction of new technologies, and an increasing number of 
cyber attacks has overwhelmed security personnel (Arce, 2003; Raghavan et al., 2008).  
Because of these attacks, users are now responsible for their systems security or 
information assurance.  This shift of responsibility is introducing a new set of security 
problems, specifically, the internal security threat caused by the inappropriate actions of 
users.  Insider threats may not occur as frequently as external attacks, but they have a 
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higher rate of success, can go undetected, and pose a greater risk than external attacks 
(Chinchani et al., 2005).  Insider threats can be classified into two categories: the 
intentional and the unintentional (Carroll, 2006).  The intentional security threat occurs 
when a party or trusted person within the organization knowingly sets out to cause 
damage or loss of data to a system (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  The unintentional security 
threat occurs when a trusted person within the organization causes damage, loss of data, 
or loss of service without direct intent (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  These internal threats 
continue to be a significant security challenge within any organization. 
Another challenge facing the security community is the gap of security knowledge 
that exists between security personnel and hackers.  Because of this knowledge gap, 
hackers are creating cyber attacks faster than security personnel can react to them.  In 
addition to these internal security challenges, hackers have shifted the focus of their 
attacks to users.  Besides the user, organizations also seem to be unprepared to deal with 
such cyber attacks.  One way to lessen the impact of these security challenges is through 
information assurance training.  Information security training not only raises users’ 
awareness level, but also provides users with the ability to recognize and prevent any 
inappropriate actions.  However, prior to conducting any security training, an 
organization security manager must assess the organizations state of security awareness 
(Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). 
Current literature on user security has received little attention from security 
researchers because information security is still considered a technical discipline 
(Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).  For example, Kostakos and O’Neill (2008) stated 
that traditional HCI literature has considered the human-in-the-loop security issues as a 
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design problem in need of appropriate interfaces, interactions, and policies.  However, 
Bishop and Frincke (2005) stated that, without understanding how people interact with 
security, it is easy to blame users for security breaches.  Finally, articles on users’ 
behaviors regarding system security have indicated that individuals are still performing 
inappropriate security behavior. 
 
  
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the methodology used for this research study.  The goal of this 
study was to assess the security behaviors and practices of the working professional.  
Research can use a quantitative or a qualitative approach (Nardi, 2003; Creswell, 2003).  
The quantitative approach employs strategies of inquiry, such as experiments and surveys 
that collect data on predetermined instruments that yield statistical data (Creswell, 2003).  
The qualitative approach employs strategies of inquiry, such as narratives, 
phenomenology, or case studies that collect open-ended, emerging data with the primary 
intent of developing themes from the data (Creswell, 2003).  Nardi (2003) stated that the 
use of a quantitative research instrument is the best approach for research intended to 
describe human behavior.  The more efficient quantitative method for measuring attitude 
and behavior is to use a closed-ended questionnaire (Nardi, 2003).  Although the closed-
ended questionnaire allows for fewer variations in participants’ responses, it is easier and 
quicker for the participants to complete (Nardi, 2003).  Self-administered questionnaires 
are best designed for studying behavior that may be difficult for people to tell someone 
else about face-to-face (Nardi, 2003).  In addition, the anonymity of self-administered 
questionnaires permits participants to be more candid, but researchers do not always 
know whether the participants are answering the questions honestly (Nardi, 2003). 
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Research Method Employed 
The main purpose of this study was to assess the security behaviors and practices of 
the common system user.  Previous research in assessing the security behavior of a user 
was conducted by Katz (2005).  To measure the participants’ security behavior, Katz 
used a 5-point Likert scale self-administered, closed-ended quantitative questionnaire.  
Because this study was a continuation of the work conducted by Katz, permission was 
obtained from Katz to adapt his methodology (see Appendix B).  This adaptation was 
vital to maintaining the integrity of the baseline developed and helped establish a viable 
launching point for this study.  The adaptation included replacing the physical security 
questions with questions regarding security training.  Because users’ behaviors can be 
influenced by their demographic groups, the adaptation also included examining the 
influence on the security behavior of four demographic variables: gender, age, education, 
and occupation.  Like Katz, this study used a 5-point Likert scale in a self-administered, 
closed-ended questionnaire.  The survey instrument was designed in two sections: The 
demographic section used a binary scale to gather the participants’ demographic data, and 
the security section used the 5-point Likert scale to measure the participants’ security 
behaviors.  Details of the study’s methodology are provided in the following sections. 
 
Participants 
The participants for this study were working professionals from the General Dynamic 
and Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault (GD & PM AAA) Facility in 
Woodbridge, Virginia.  PM AAA is no different from any other organization that is 
responsible for securing information ranging from organizationally sensitive information 
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to personnel evaluations.  The participants from PM AAA Office were selected because 
PM AAA is not only a research and development facility but also a paperless 
environment.  Because the employees use computers on a daily basis, their computer 
skills and security knowledge should be good.  The total population at the PM AAA 
Office was 288. 
 
Privacy Protection 
Research involving human subjects needs to have a research plan reviewed by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the researcher’s institution and the participating 
organization’s IRB or designated authority (Creswell, 2003).  These IRB committees 
exist because of federal regulations that provide for the protection of human rights 
against violations (Creswell, 2003).  To resolve any ethical issues concerning human 
rights violations and to protect the participants’ privacy and anonymity, the survey was 
submitted to the PM AAA Operations Officer, who reviewed the survey and submitted it 
to the Program Manager (PM) for approval (see Appendix C).  After PM AAA approval 
was received, the survey instrument was submitted to Nova Southeastern University 
(NSU) IRB for approval (see Appendix D).  Upon notification of NSU IRB approval, the 
researcher conducted the survey. 
 
Variables 
Measuring behavior is normally accomplished through the use of a questionnaire that 
measures the variables among the demographics (Nardi, 2003; Singh et al., 2007).  The 
variables for this study include an independent variable—the security behavior of a 
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user—and a dependent variable—the security awareness level of a user.  The independent 
variable or security behavior by demographics was collected from the survey 
questionnaire.  The dependent variable or security awareness level was determined from 
the tabulated results of the survey instrument. 
 
Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument was an adaptation of the questionnaire developed by Katz 
(2005).  To increase the response rate, the researcher limited the questions in each section 
to one page (Kruck & Teer, 2008).  The survey instrument consisted of (a) a cover sheet, 
(b) a demographic section, and (c) a security section (see Appendix E). 
 
Cover Sheet 
The cover sheet included (a) a statement informing the participant that the survey was 
for a doctoral dissertation, (b) a statement that all information collected would be 
confidential, (c) a participation consent statement to inform the participant that the survey 
complied with IRB requirements, (d) a statement that all information gathered would 
remain anonymous, and (e) a thank you note for participating in the survey. 
 
Demographic Section 
The demographics section (Section 1) included (a) instruction on completing the 
questionnaire and (b) questions that elicited the participant’s demographic data.  Critical 
in understanding human behavior is knowing how behavior varies across different groups 
or demographics (Nardi, 2003) because a person’s behavior is influenced by cultures and 
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groups that develop their own values and norms over time (Karahanna et al., 2005).  
Collecting this information was important because earlier studies on the impact of such 
demographics as age and gender on computer usage may no longer be accurate (Knight & 
Pearson, 2005).  According to Nardi (2003), questions about gender, race, age, income, 
education, and occupation are typical of demographic information.  Because a user’s 
behavior can be influenced by his or her demographic group membership, this study 
examined the influence of four demographic variables: gender, age, education, and 
occupation.  A cross-reference matrix of Section 1 (the demographic section) to the 
survey instrument is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Demographic Section (Section 1) Cross-Reference Matrix 
Demographic 
(Population) 
Survey Question Questionnaire 
Number  
Gender  Are you a female?  1 
Age  Are you age 40 and over?  2 
Education level  Are you a college graduate?  3 
Occupation  Are you in a technical position?  4 
 
To understand the participants’ security behaviors, this study compared the results of 
the security questionnaire across the four demographics groups: gender (men vs. women), 
age (older participants vs. younger participants), education (college graduates vs. 
noncollege participants), and occupation (participants in technical positions vs. those in 
nontechnical positions). 
Concerning the first demographic group of gender, Zukowski and Brown (2007) 
noted that women were more concerned about online security and privacy than their male 
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counterparts.  This study assessed the gender group with the following question: Are 
female users more security aware? 
In terms of the second demographic group, Zukowski and Brown (2007) stated that 
older users are more concerned about online security and privacy than their younger 
counterparts.  For this study, older participants were defined as those aged 40 and over 
while younger participants were those aged 39 and younger.  This study assessed the age 
group by seeking to answer the following question: Are users aged 40 and over more 
security aware? 
Concerning the third demographic group of education, Zukowski and Brown (2007) 
indicated that individuals with lower levels of education may perform fewer online 
actions because of having greater concern about security than their counterparts with 
higher levels of education.  For this study, lower levels of education were defined as not 
having attended college while higher levels of education were defined as having 
graduated from college.  This study assessed the education group by answering the 
following question: Are users with higher levels of education more security aware? 
Considering the fourth demographic group of occupation, Suchan (2003) stated that 
employees in technical positions or with technical backgrounds tended to violate or 
bypass security procedures more than their nontechnical counterparts.  For this study, 
technical positions were defined as positions that required a college degree in engineering 
or information technology while nontechnical positions were defined as positions that did 
not require technical skills or abilities, such as logisticians and administrative personnel.  
This study assessed the occupation group by answering the following question: Are users 
in technical positions more security aware? 
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Security Section 
The security section (Section 2) included (a) instruction on how to complete the 
questionnaire and (b) questions to gather the participants’ security data.  Security threats 
caused by users’ inappropriate actions continue to be a significant security problem 
within any organization (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004; Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  Users 
must known when not to execute a dangerous e-mail attachment, when not to install 
online software, and when and how to take appropriate action when confronted with 
security threats (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).  One way to lessen the impact of these 
security challenges is through information assurance training.  Information security 
training not only raises user awareness levels but also provides users with the ability to 
recognize and prevent any inappropriate actions.  A user’s security awareness level was 
defined as whether a user would know whether an activity was wrong, would choose to 
report the misuse of the system, and would report a security incident.  This section 
assessed whether the participants had been performing the simple everyday practices and 
behaviors necessary to avert insider threats.  The security questionnaire was based on 
three security domains: (a) security training, (b) essential security practices, and (c) 
appropriate security actions.  A cross-referenced matrix of the security section (Section 2) 
to the survey instrument is provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Security Section (Section 2) Cross-Reference Matrix 
Survey Security  
Awareness 
Survey Question  Questionnaire 
Number  
Security Training  These questions ascertain the 
individual’s security awareness training  
1, 2 
Essential Security 
Practices  
These questions ascertain the proper/ 
essential security practices  
3, 4  
Appropriate Security 
Practices  
These questions ascertain the proper 
security behavior/actions  
5, 6, 7  
 
The security training domain was addressed through two questions (Questions 1 and 
2) that measured the participants’ responses concerning security training and their ability 
to report security threats or virus alerts.  Boyce and Jennings (2002) noted that, to prevent 
security threats, personnel need to participate in security training and know how to report 
security threats; that is, they should always participate in training and always report a 
security threat (Boyce & Jennings, 2002). 
The essential security practices domain was investigated through two questions 
(Question 3 and 4) that measured the participants’ responses concerning protecting their 
unattended systems and scanning e-mail attachments for viruses.  Boyce and Jennings 
(2002) indicated that, to prevent unauthorized access, personnel need to protect their 
unattended systems by using a screen lock and scanning email attachments; that is, they 
should always secure their systems and scan attachments for viruses. 
The appropriate security actions domain was addressed through three questions 
(Questions 5, 6 and 7) that measured the participants’ responses concerning system 
security settings, access to their systems, and web downloads.  Boyce and Jennings 
(2002) indicated that, to prevent unauthorized access, personnel need to disable the 
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automated password feature, prevent other people from accessing their systems, and 
avoid web downloading of applications; that is, they should never use the automated 
password feature, never provide others access to their systems, and never download web 
applications. 
This entire section measured the participants’ security behavior in order to answer the 
research question of whether there a relation between users’ security behaviors and their 
levels of security awareness. 
 
Measures 
The survey instrument was designed in two sections having the following formats for 
collecting and measuring data on the participants: 
 Demographic section (Section 1) used a binary (yes/no) format. 
 Security section (Section 2) used a 5-point Likert scale (Always, Sometimes, 
Neutral, Seldom, and Never) to measure participants’ security behaviors. 
The Likert scale is a common scaling technique used for closed-ended survey research 
(Nardi, 2003).  To complete the security questionnaire, participants were asked to place 
an ―X‖ in the appropriate box to the right of each question.  An example question from 
Section 2 is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Security Section Example Question 
 Always Sometime Neutral Seldom Never 
1. Do you participate in security training?       
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Data Collection 
Data collection consisted of collecting the completed surveys and entering the data 
into a computer.  The PM AAA Operations Officer collected and safeguarded the 
completed surveys (as indicated in Appendix C).  Once collected, the responses were 
reviewed for usability.  Partially completed questionnaires were considered unusable 
(Nardi, 2003).  Responses from all usable questionnaires were entered in a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet.  The collected surveys were kept in a secure location during the time 
the data were being entered.  Afterward, the researcher destroyed all printed surveys. 
 
Data Coding 
The collected data were recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  Because each 
participant indicated a response with an ―X,‖ when the data were recorded in the 
spreadsheet, the ―X‖ was replaced with a ―1‖ in order to tabulate all categorical data. 
 
Format for Presenting the Results 
Results of this study are presented in Chapter 4.  Nardi (2004) stated that there are 
several ways of presenting data, including frequency tables, graphs or tables, and 
statistical significance.  To determine statistical significance, social scientists have 
generally accepted that, if the probability value, symbolized by the lowercase p, is less 
than 5% (p < .05), the result is considered statistically significant (Nardi, 2003).  For this 
study, a probability value of less than 5% was used.  The t test was used to determine the 
statistical significance of the demographic data, and the Pearson chi-square was used to 
determine the statistical significance of the population’s security data. 
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Resources Used 
Resources required for this study included (a) a computer; (b) Microsoft Word for 
developing the survey instrument; (c) Microsoft Excel for recording the data, creating the 
frequency tables and bar graphs, and providing a statistical spreadsheet using the Excel 
chi-square and t test formulas; (d) a printer; (e) Internet access; and (f) access to PM 
AAA Intranet. 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology used for this study.  The goal of the study 
was to determine whether the employees at a mid-sized research and manufacturing 
facility were engaging in proper information security behaviors and practices.  Previous 
research that assessed the security behaviors of users had been conducted by Katz (2005).  
To measure the participants’ security behavior, Katz used a 5-point Likert scale on a self-
administered, closed-ended quantitative questionnaire.  Because this study was a 
continuation of the work conducted by Katz, permission was obtained from him to adapt 
his methodology.  This adaption was vital not only in maintaining the integrity of the 
baseline developed but also in providing a viable launching point for this study.  This 
study’s adaptation included replacing the physical/location questions with questions 
regarding security training.  The demographic was expanded from faculty and staff to 
four demographic groups: gender, age, education, and occupation.  Like that of Katz, this 
study used a self-administered, closed-ended questionnaire.  The survey instrument used 
a binary scale to gather the participants’ demographic data and a 5-point Likert scale to 
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measure the participants’ security behaviors.  The survey instrument was designed in 
three parts: (a) a cover letter, (b) a demographic section, and (c) a security section.  The 
security questions were developed from three security domains: (a) security training, (b) 
essential security practices, and (c) appropriate security actions.  The results of the survey 
are presented in Chapter 4, using frequency tables and bar graphs.  The survey’s results 
were analyzed using the following statistical tests: (a) demographic data were analyzed 
with a t test and (b) security behavior data were analyzed with the Pearson chi-square 
test.  To determine whether the findings for both demographic groups and the participant 
population were statistically significant, a probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was used. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
Background  
This chapter presents the findings of this research study.  The goal of this study was 
to determine the participants’ behaviors and practices in information security.  The study 
used a self-administered, closed-ended questionnaire to collect data on the demographic 
and research questions posed in the study.  The findings are presented in frequency tables 
and graphs.  Frequency tables show how each participant responded or scored on a given 
question (Nardi, 2003).  Heiman (2006) stated that the most common way to organize 
scores is to create a simple frequency distribution, which shows the number of times each 
score occurs in a set of data.  For this study, the frequency for each response or score is 
listed in raw numbers of occurrence and in percentages relative to the number of total 
responses (Nardi, 2003).  According to Heiman (2006), presenting data in a graph or 
table is important for two reasons: 
 First, it answers questions about the different scores that occurred in the data in an 
organized manner. 
 Second, such presentations of data provide the building blocks for other 
descriptive and inferential statistics. 
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Findings 
The survey instrument was designed in two sections: the first section focused on 
gathering the participants’ demographic data while the second section focused on 
gathering information on the participants’ security behaviors and practices.  A total of 
288 employees received the survey, and 92 returned the survey, with 87 or 30% 
completing the survey.  The data in this study were taken from the 87 completed surveys.  
Responses to the survey were recorded and analyzed using a t test to determine the 
statistical significance between the demographic groups and a Pearson chi-square to 
determine the statistical significance of the participant’s security responses. 
 
Demographics 
This section presents the participants’ responses to the survey’s demographic 
questions.  A binary (yes/no) scale was used to record the participants’ responses.  Table 
4 shows the participants’ responses in frequency and percentages.  Figure 1 is a bar graph 
of the participants’ responses in percentages.  The results in terms of demographics are as 
follows: 
 Gender: 77% of the participants indicated they were male. 
 Age: 60.9% of the participants indicated they were age 40 or over. 
 Education: 74.7% of the participants indicated they had attended college. 
 Occupation: 64.4% of the participants indicated they were in a technical position. 
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Table 4. Demographic Data 
Demographic 
Questions 
Frequency  Percent 
Yes No  Yes No 
1. Are you a female? 20 67  23.0 77.0 
2. Are you age 40 and over? 53 34  60.9 39.1 
3. Are you a college graduate? 65 22  74.7 25.3 
4. Are you in a technical position? 56 31  64.4 35.6 
 
 
Legend:  
F = Female, M = Male, 40+ = Age 40 & over, 39- = Age 39 & under, COL = College, NCOL 
= No College, TEC = Technical, NTEC = Nontechnical  
Figure 1. Demographic data. 
 
Security Survey 
This section presents the participants’ responses to the survey’s security questions.  A 
5-point Likert scale was used to record the participants’ responses as shown in Tables 5 
to 11. 
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Security Question 1 
Table 5 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 1: Do you 
participate in security training?  According to the results, a majority (70.1%) of the 
sample population always participated in security training.  The remaining responses 
included 11.5% indicating they sometimes participated in security training, 10.3% 
indicating they seldom participated in security training, 2.3% indicated they never 
participated in security training, and 5.7% remained neutral. 
 
Table 5. Responses to Security Question 1 
Likert scale Frequency Percent 
Always 61 70.1 
Sometimes 10 11.5 
Neutral 5 5.7 
Seldom 9 10.3 
Never 2 2.3 
Total 87 100.0 
 
Security Question 2 
Table 6 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 2: Do you know 
who to contact if you get a virus alert?  According to the results, a majority (90.8%) of 
the sample population always knew who to contact if a security problem occurred. The 
remaining responses included 3.4% sometimes knowing who to contact, 3.4% never 
knowing who to contact, and 2.3% remained neutral concerning knowing who to contact 
if a security problem occurred. 
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Table 6. Responses to Security Question 2 
Likert scale Frequency Percent 
Always 79 90.8 
Sometimes 3 3.4 
Neutral 2 2.3 
Seldom 0 0.0 
Never 3 3.4 
Total 87 100.0 
 
Security Question 3 
Table 7 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 3: Do you lock your 
screen or use a screen saver when you leave your computer?  According to the results, a 
majority (65.5%) of the sample population always locked or used a screen saver when 
they left their computers. The remaining responses included 29.9% indicating they 
sometimes locked their screens, 2.3% indicating they seldom locked their screen, 1.1% 
indicating they never locked their screens, and 1.1% remaining neutral concerning 
locking their screens or using a screen saver when leaving their computers.  
Table 7. Responses to Security Question 3 
Likert scale Frequency Percent 
Always 57 65.5 
Sometimes 26 29.9 
Neutral 1 1.1 
Seldom 2 2.3 
Never 1 1.1 
Total 87 100.0 
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Security Question 4 
Table 8 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 4: Do you scan all e-
mail attachments for viruses?  According to the results, under half (40.2%) of the sample 
population always scanned their e-mail attachments for viruses.  The remaining responses 
included 10.3% indicating they sometimes scanned their e-mail attachments, 13.8% 
indicating they seldom scanned their e-mail attachments, 23% indicating they never 
scanned their e-mail attachments, and 12.6% remaining neutral concerning scanning their 
e-mail attachments for viruses. 
Table 8. Responses to Security Question 4 
Likert scale Frequency Percent 
Always 35 40.2 
Sometimes 9 10.3 
Neutral 11 12.6 
Seldom 12 13.8 
Never 20 23.0 
Total 87 100.0 
 
Security Question 5 
Table 9 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 5: Do you use the 
automatic save/remember password feature on your computer?  This question was 
designed with a negative or never response.  According to the results, under half (44.8%) 
of the sample population never used the automatic save/remember password feature. The 
remaining responses included 10.3% indicating they always used the save/remember 
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password feature, 21.8% indicating they sometimes used the save/remember password 
feature, 17.2% indicating they seldom used the save/remember password feature, and 
5.7% remained neutral concerning using the automatic save/remember password feature. 
Table 9. Responses to Security Question 5 
Likert scale Frequency Percent 
Always 9 10.3 
Sometimes 19 21.8 
Neutral 5 5.7 
Seldom 15 17.2 
Never 39 44.8 
Total 87 100.0 
 
Security Question 6 
Table 10 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 6: Do other people 
have access or use of your computer?  This question was designed with a negative or 
never response.  According to the results, under half (46%) of the sample population 
never let other people have access to or use their computers.  The remaining responses 
included 8% indicating they always let other people have access to or use of their 
computers, 18.4% indicating they sometimes let other people have access to or use of 
their computers, 20.7% indicating they seldom let other people have access to or use of 
their computers, and 6.9% remaining neutral concerning letting other people have access 
to or use of their computers. 
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Table 10. Responses to Security Question 6 
Likert scale Frequency Percent 
Always 7 8.0 
Sometimes 16 18.4 
Neutral 6 6.9 
Seldom 18 20.7 
Never 40 46.0 
Total 87 100.0 
 
Security Question 7 
Table 11 presents the participants’ responses to Security Question 7: Do you 
download anything from the web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, video clips, etc.)?  
This question was designed with a negative or never response.  According to the results, 
under half (48.3%) of the sample population never downloaded anything from the web.  
The remaining responses included 23% indicating they sometimes downloaded from the 
web, 27.6% indicating they seldom downloaded from the web, and 1.1% remained 
neutral concerning downloading from the web.  
Table 11. Responses to Security Question 7 
Likert scale Frequency Percent 
Always 0 0.0 
Sometimes 20 23.0 
Neutral 1 1.1 
Seldom 24 27.6 
Never 42 48.3 
Total 87 100.0 
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Analysis of Survey Questions 
This section addresses the study’s four demographic questions (DQ) and the research 
question (RQ).  The survey questions were as follows: 
DQ1: Are female users more security aware? 
DQ2: Are users age 40 and over more security aware? 
DQ3: Are users with higher levels of education more security aware? 
DQ4: Are users in technical positions more security aware? 
RQ: Is there a relationship between users’ security behaviors and their levels of 
security awareness? 
Data from the Likert scales can be simplified by either combining the response 
categories or reducing the results into nominal categories such as agree/disagree (Waikar 
& Huynh, 2008).  Furthermore, Casper and Floyd (2009) indicated that the end point can 
be used as summated rating scales.  For this study, the data from the Likert scales were 
simplified by reducing the following: (a) questions 1 through 4 used the always end point 
and (b) questions 5 through 7 used the never end point.  The survey results were analyzed 
using the following statistical tests: (a) for demographic data, the t test was used, and (b) 
for security data, the Pearson chi-square test was used.  To determine whether the 
findings for both the demographics and population were statistically significant, a 
probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was used. 
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Demographic Question 1 Gender Group 
This section addressed the gender question: Are female users more security aware?  
The results of the security questionnaire by gender are presented in frequency and 
percentages in Table 12.  The findings indicate how each group responded to each of the 
security questions.  To address the gender question, the data were statistically analyzed 
using Microsoft’s Excel TTEST (see Table 13). 
Table 12. Security Responses by Gender 
Security 
questions 
Frequency  Percent 
F 
(n = 20) 
M 
(n = 67) 
 F 
 
M 
 
Q1 14 47  70.0 70.1 
Q2 18 61  90.0 91.0 
Q3 13 44  65.0 65.7 
Q4 10 25  50.0 37.3 
Q5 9 30  45.0 44.9 
Q6 7 33  35.0 49.3 
Q7 12 30  60.0 44.8 
Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 
100 (e.g., Q1 F = 14/20 x 100, M = 47/67 x 100). 
F = female; M = male. 
 
Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby 
answering the question that female participants were more security aware than their male 
counterparts, as indicated in Table 13.  In addition to answering the demographic 
question, the responses on the three security domains were analyzed to better understand 
where the security issues reside.  Results of two of the three security domains, security 
training and appropriate security practices, were statistically significant, as shown in 
55 
 
Table 13.  Female participants were overall more security aware; however, the results for 
the security domains indicate that males were more security aware in regards to security 
training while females were more security aware in regards to appropriate security 
practices.  The findings also indicated that the participants’ essential security practices 
and appropriate security practices were under 58%, indicating that each gender group had 
poor security practices. 
Table 13. Security Analysis by Gender 
Security domains Frequency 
 Percent  t test 
F 
(n = 20) 
M 
(n = 67) 
 F M 
 
df Sig. 
Gender total 
11.9 38.6  59.3 57.6  6 8.59E-05* 
Security training 
16.0 54.0  80.0 80.6  1 0.01740* 
Essential security practices 
11.5 34.5  57.5 51.5  1 0.06962* 
Appropriate security practices 
9.3 31.0  46.7 46.3  2 0.00013* 
Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100. 
F= female; M = male. 
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test). 
 
Demographic Question 2 Age Group 
This section addresses the age question: Are users age 40 and over more security 
aware?  The results of the security questionnaire by age are presented in frequency and 
percentages in Table 14.  The findings indicate how each group responded to each of the 
security questions.  To address the age question, the data were statistically analyzed using 
Microsoft’s Excel TTEST (see Table 15). 
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Table 14. Security Responses by Age 
Security 
questions 
Frequency  Percent 
40+ 
(n = 53) 
< 40 
(n = 34) 
 40+ 
 
< 40 
 
Q1 39 22  73.6 64.7 
Q2 48 31  90.6 91.2 
Q3 34 23  64.2 67.6 
Q4 20 15  37.7 44.1 
Q5 22 17  41.5 50.0 
Q6 20 20  37.7 58.8 
Q7 25 17  47.2 50.0 
Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 
100. 
40+ = age 40 and over; < 40 = age 39 and under. 
 
Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby 
indicating that participants age 40 and over were not more security aware than their 
younger counterparts, as shown in Table 15.  In addition to the age question, the 
responses to the three security domains were analyzed to better understand where the 
security issues reside.  The results indicated that only one of the three security domains, 
appropriate security practices, was statistically significant, as shown in Table 15.  
Participants age 39 and younger were overall more security aware, including in terms of 
appropriate security practices.  The findings also indicate that the participants’ essential 
security practices and appropriate security practices was under 56%, indicating that each 
age group had poor security practices. 
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Table 15. Security Analysis by Age 
Security domains Frequency 
 Percent  t test 
40+ 
(n = 53) 
< 40 
(n = 34) 
 40+ < 40 
 
df Sig. 
Age total 
29.7 20.7  56.1 60.9  6 0.036* 
Security training 
43.5 26.5  82.1 77.9  1 0.058 * 
Essential security practices 
27.0 19.0  50.9 55.9  1 0.213 * 
Appropriate security practices 
22.3 18.0  42.1 52.9  2 0.035 * 
Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100. 
40+ = age 40 and over; < 40 = age 39 and under. 
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test). 
 
Demographic Question 3 Education Group 
This section addresses the education question: Are users with higher levels of 
education more security aware?  The results of the security questionnaire by education 
are presented in frequency and percentages in Table 16.  The findings indicate how each 
group responded to each of the security questions.  To address the education question, the 
data were statistically analyzed using Microsoft’s Excel TTEST, as shown in Table 17. 
Table 16. Security Responses by Education 
Security 
questions 
Frequency  Percent 
COL 
(n = 65) 
NCOL 
(n = 22) 
 COL 
 
NCOL 
 
Q1 45 16  69.2 72.7 
Q2 59 20  90.8 90.0 
Q3 40 17  61.5 77.3 
Q4 25 10  38.5 45.5 
Q5 24 15  36.9 68.2 
Q6 33 7  50.8 31.8 
Q7 30 12  46.2 54.5 
Note. Percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100. 
COL = college; NCOL = no college. 
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Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby 
answering the question of whether participants with higher levels of education were more 
security aware than their noncollege counterparts (see Table 17).  In addition to 
answering the education question, the data for the three security domains were analyzed 
to better understand where the security issues reside.  The results indicate that two of the 
three security domains, security training and appropriate security practices, were 
statistically significant, as shown in Table 17.  Noncollege participants were overall more 
security aware, including in terms of the security domains of security training and 
appropriate security practices.  The findings also indicate that the participants’ essential 
security practices and appropriate security practices were under 62%, indicating that each 
education group had poor security practices. 
Table 17. Security Analysis by Education 
Security domains Frequency 
 Percent  t test 
COL 
(n = 65) 
NCOL 
(n = 22) 
 COL NCOL 
 
df Sig. 
Education total 
36.6 13.9  56.3 63.0  6 0.0006* 
Security training 
52.0 18.0  80.0 81.8  1 0.0214 * 
Essential security practices 
32.5 13.5  50.0 61.4  1 0.0742 * 
Appropriate security practices 
29.0 11.3  44.6 51.5  2 0.0037 * 
Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100. 
COL = college; NCOL = no college. 
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test). 
 
Demographic Question 4 Occupation Group 
This section addresses the occupation question: Are users in a technical position more 
security aware?  The results of the security questionnaire by occupation are presented in 
frequency and percentages in Table 18.  The findings indicate how each group responded 
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to each of the security questions.  To address the occupation question, the data were 
statistically analyzed using Microsoft’s Excel TTEST (see Table 19). 
Table 18. Security Responses by Occupation 
Security 
questions 
Frequency  Percent 
TEC 
(n = 56) 
NTEC 
(n = 31) 
 TEC 
 
NTEC 
 
Q1 36 25  64.3 80.6 
Q2 53 25  94.6 83.9 
Q3 36 21  64.3 67.7 
Q4 22 13  39.3 41.9 
Q5 25 14  44.6 45.2 
Q6 21 19  37.5 61.3 
Q7 25 17  44.6 54.8 
Note. Percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100. 
TEC = technical position; NTEC = nontechnical position. 
 
Results of the t test determined that the findings were statistically significant, thereby 
answering the question of whether participants in technical positions were more security 
aware than those in nontechnical positions (see Table 19).  In addition to answering the 
occupation question, the data for the three security domains were analyzed to better 
understand where the security issues reside.  The results indicate that only one of the 
three security domains, appropriate security practices, was statistically significant, as 
shown in Table 19.  Participants in nontechnical positions were, overall, more security 
aware, including in terms of appropriate security practices.  The findings also indicate 
that the participants’ essential security practices and appropriate security practices were 
under 55%, indicating that each occupation group had poor security practices. 
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Table 19. Security Analysis by Occupation 
Security 
domains 
Frequency  Percent  t test 
TEC 
(n = 56) 
NTEC 
(n = 31) 
 TEC NTEC 
 
df Sig. 
Occupational total 
31.1 19.3  55.6 62.2  6 0.0138* 
Security training 
44.5 25.5  79.5 82.3  1 0.0770 * 
Essential security practices 
29.0 17.0  51.8 54.8  1 0.1370 * 
Appropriate security practices 
23.7 16.7  42.3 53.8  2 0.0110 * 
Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100. 
TEC = technical position; NTEC = nontechnical position. 
* p < .05 (one-tailed, two sample equal variance test). 
 
Research Question 
This section addresses the study’s research question: Is there a relation between users’ 
security behaviors and their levels of security awareness?  The results of the security 
survey are presented in frequencies and percentages in Table 20.  The findings indicate 
how participants responded to each of the security questions.  To address the research 
question, the data were statistically analyzed using Microsoft Excel CHITEST (see Table 
21). 
Table 20. Security Responses by Population 
Security 
questions 
Population 
Frequency Percent 
Q1 61 70.1 
Q2 79 90.8 
Q3 57 65.5 
Q4 35 40.2 
Q5 39 44.8 
Q6 40 46.0 
Q7 42 48.3 
Note. Percentage is frequency divided by total participants multiplied 
by 100.  
N = 87. 
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Results of the chi-square test determined that the findings were statistically 
significant, thereby answering the research question of whether there is a relation 
between users’ security behaviors and their levels of security awareness (see Table 21).  
In addition to answering the research question, the data for the three security domains 
were analyzed to better understand where the security issues reside.  The results indicate 
that only one of the three security domains, essential security practices, was statistically 
significant, as shown in Table 21.  The findings also indicate that the participants’ 
essential security practices and appropriate security practices were under 55%, indicating 
that the sample population had poor security practices. 
Table 21. Security Analysis by Population 
Security domains Population  Chi-square test 
Frequency Percent  df Sig. 
Participant total 50.4 58.0  6 3.7E-05 
Security training 70.0 80.5  1 0.1282 * 
Essential security practices 46.0 52.9  1 0.0218 * 
Appropriate security practices 40.3 46.4  2 0.9438 * 
Note. The percentage is the frequency divided by the total participants multiplied by 100. 
N = 87. 
* p < .05. 
 
Security Questions Range 
This section presents the security results by the highest and lowest scores for each 
demographic group and total population (see Table 22).  A break-down by security 
responses was conducted in order to understand where the security issues lay according 
to the sample population.  Questions with high responses indicate strong security 
behaviors and practices while low responses indicate weak security behaviors and 
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practices.  The findings indicate (see Table 22) that only one question received a 
consistently high response rate for each demographic group and the total population: Do 
you know who to contact if you get a virus alert?  The results indicate that the 
participants had strong security behaviors and practices in regards to security training 
because they knew whom to contact if their systems had a security warning/alert.  In 
addition, the findings indicate that the lowest response rate was shared among three 
security questions: (a) Question 4: Do you scan all email attachments for viruses? (b) 
Question 6: Do other people have access or use of your computer? (c) Question 5: Do 
you use the automatic save/remember password feature on your computer? (See Table 
22.)  The results indicate that the participants had weak security behaviors and practices 
in terms of scanning email attachments for viruses, allowing others access to or use of 
their systems, and using the system stored or saved password feature. 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the results of this study.  The goal was to measure the security 
behaviors of the sample population in order to determine the participants’ security 
awareness levels.  The data for this study were taken from 87 surveys completed by the 
sample population.  The survey responses were used to address the study’s four 
demographic questions (DQ) and its research question (RQ):  (a) DQ1: Are female users 
more security aware?  (b) DQ2: Are users age 40 and over more security aware?  (c) 
DQ3: Are users with higher levels of education more security aware?  (d) DQ4: Are users 
in technical positions more security aware?  (e) RQ: Is there a relation between users’ 
security behaviors and their levels of security awareness? 
63 
 
Table 22. Security Questions Range 
Demographic 
Group 
High range  Low range 
SEC-Q Percent  SEC-Q Percent 
Gender      
F Q-2 91.0  Q-4 37.3 
M Q-2 90.0  Q-6 35.0 
Age      
40+ Q-2 90.6  * Q-4/Q-6 37.7 
< 40  Q-2 91.2  Q-4 44.1 
Education      
COL Q-2 90.8  Q-5 36.9 
NCOL Q-2 90.9  Q-6 31.8 
Occupation      
TEC Q-2 94.6  Q-6 37.5 
NTEC Q-2 83.9  Q-4 41.9 
Population Q-2 90.8  Q-4 40.2 
F = female, M = male; 40+ = age 40 and over, > 40 = age 39 and under; COL = college, NCOL = No 
college; TEC = technical position, NTEC = nontechnical position.  
* Questions that had the same responses. 
 
To answer the study’s questions the results were analyzed using the following 
statistical tests: (a) the t test for the demographic data, and (b) the Pearson chi-square test 
for the security behavior data.  To determine whether the findings for both the 
demographics and population were statistically significant, a probability of less than 5% 
(p < .05) was used.  The results determined the following: (a) DQ1 findings were 
statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether female participants 
were more security aware than their male counterparts.  (b) DQ2 findings were 
statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether participants age 40 
and over were more security aware than their younger counterparts.  (c) DQ3 findings 
were statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether participants with 
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higher levels of education were more security aware than their noncollege counterparts.  
(d) DQ4 findings were statistically significant, thereby answering the question of whether 
participants in technical positions were more security aware than their nontechnical 
counterparts.  (e) RQ findings were statistically significant, thereby answering the 
research question of whether there is a relation between users’ security behaviors and 
their levels of security awareness. 
The study also compared the security results by the highest and lowest scores for each 
demographic group and total population.  The findings indicate that one question, 
Question 2, consistently had a high response rate by each demographic group and the 
total population: Do you know who to contact if you get a virus alert?  The results 
determined that the participants had strong security behaviors and practices in regards to 
security training because they knew who to contact if their systems displayed a security 
warning/alert.  In addition, the findings indicate that the lowest response rate was shared 
across three security questions: (a) Q4 Do you scan all email attachments for viruses?  (b) 
Q6 Do other people have access or use of your computer?  (c) Q5 Do you use the 
automatic save/remember password feature on your computer?  The results determined 
that the participants had weak security behaviors and practices in regards to scanning 
email attachments for viruses, allowing others access to or use of their systems, and using 
the system stored/saved password feature. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary  
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this study was to determine whether employees were engaging in proper 
information security behavior and practices.  Doing so was accomplished by measuring 
participants’ security behaviors and practices using a 5-point Likert scale in a self-
administered, closed-ended, quantitative questionnaire.  The sample population consisted 
of working professionals at a mid-sized research and manufacturing facility in northern 
Virginia.  The response rate for this study was 30%.  The participants’ responses were 
used to answer the study’s four demographic questions and the research question.  The 
data were analyzed using the following statistical analysis tools:  Demographic data were 
analyzed using a t test, and population security data were analyzed using the Pearson chi-
square.  To determine whether the findings were statistically significant for both the 
demographic groups and the entire population, a probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was 
used. 
The first demographic question was as follows: Are female users more security 
aware?  The results were statistically significant, indicating that females were more 
security aware than their male counterparts.  To better understand where the security 
issues resided, the results were analyzed according to the three security domains.  The 
findings indicated that responses for two of the three security domains were statistically 
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significant: security training and appropriate security practices.  Although female 
participants were generally more security aware, results by the security domains indicated 
that male participants were more security aware in regards to security training while 
female participants were more security aware in regards to appropriate security practices. 
The second demographic question was as follows: Are users age 40 and over more 
security aware?  The results were statistically significant, indicating that participants age 
39 and younger were more security aware than their counterparts age 40 and over.  To 
better understand where the security issues resided, the results were analyzed according 
to the three security domains.  The findings indicated that the responses for only one of 
the three security domains were statistically significant: appropriate security practices.  
Younger participants were more security aware not only in general but also in the 
security domain. 
The third demographic question was the following: Are users with higher levels of 
education more security aware?  The results were statistically significant, indicating that 
participants who did not attend college (noncollege) were more security aware than their 
higher educated counterparts.  To better understand where the security issues resided, the 
results were analyzed according to the three security domains.  The findings indicated 
that responses concerning two of the three security domains were statistically significant: 
security training and appropriate security practices.  Noncollege participants were more 
security aware in general and, specifically, in those two security domains than those 
without higher education. 
The fourth demographic question was as follows: Are users in a technical position 
more security aware?  The results were statistically significant, indicating that 
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participants in nontechnical positions were more security aware than their counterparts in 
technical positions.  To better understand where the security issues resided, the results 
were analyzed according to the three security domains.  The findings indicated that only 
one of the three security domains was statistically significant: appropriate security 
practices. 
The following research question guided this study: Is there a relation between users’ 
security behaviors and their levels of security awareness?  The results were statistically 
significant, indicating that a relation exists between users’ security behaviors and their 
levels of security awareness. 
In order to understand where the differences among security issues lay for the total 
population, the results were reviewed according to security responses.  This review 
resulted in identifying the highest and lowest scores for each demographic group and the 
total population.  The security question receiving the highest responses from each 
demographic group and the total population was Question 2: Do you know who to 
contact if you get a virus alert?  The responses indicated that the participants know who 
to contact if they receive a virus alert.  Three security questions received the lowest 
responses from each demographic group and the total population: (a) Question 4: Do you 
scan all email attachments for viruses? (b) Question 6: Do other people have access or 
use of your computer? (c) Question 5: Do you use the automatic save/remember 
password feature on your computer?  These results indicated that the participants had 
weak security behaviors and practices in regards to scanning email attachments, allowing 
others to have access to their systems, and using the stored/saved password feature on 
their system. 
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Implications 
This study has a number of implications concerning individuals’ security practices 
and behaviors.  First, results of the survey indicated that younger participants were more 
security aware than their older counterparts.  This finding challenges the results of the 
literature review that older individuals are more concerned about security than their 
younger counterparts.  Second, results for the research question indicated that a relation 
exists between individuals’ security behaviors and their levels of security awareness; 
however, the overall response rate of the sample population was 58%, indicating that 
42% of the population engages in inappropriate security practices and behaviors.   
Furthermore, the low responses for the security questions indicated the following: (a) 
40.2% of the participants always scanned their email attachments for viruses while 58.2% 
do not, making their systems vulnerable to a virus attack; (b) 40.6% of the participants 
never allowed others access to their system while 59.4% allowed others access to their 
system, making their systems or the data on their systems vulnerable to compromise; and 
(c) 44.8% of the participants never used the automatic/save password feature while 
55.2% used the feature, leaving their systems’ passwords vulnerable to being 
compromised.  These results indicate that the participants were either ignoring their 
training by engaging in poor security practices or the security training provided did not 
raise their security awareness level enough to prevent such poor practices.   
The results of this study will enhance the existing body of security knowledge by 
providing the security community with a better understanding of individuals’ security 
practices and behaviors.  These results could be used in developing ways to reduce the 
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inappropriate user actions, thereby increasing organizations’ and individuals’ information 
security. 
 
Recommendations 
Results of this study make it clear that further research is needed.  Areas for future 
research include assessing individuals’ security practices and behaviors in other 
organization or business environments.  Moreover, because the results of the study 
challenged the literature by indicating that younger employees were more security aware 
than older employees, an effort should be made to verify the results of this study.  
Another area for further research is that of assessing organizations’ security training to 
determine whether training improves the awareness levels of individuals.  These 
recommendations can be used to avert the inappropriate user actions and reduce the 
number of internal security threats. 
 
Summary 
Threats to information security are constantly growing and vary from organization to 
organization, but the one threat that remains the same, regardless of the type of 
organization, is the insider security threat (Carroll, 2006).  Insider security threats 
resulting from poor judgment or inappropriate actions by a user continue to be a 
significant security problem within all types of organizations (Aytes & Connolly, 2004).  
Inappropriate actions include any of the following: (a) leaving a laptop or sensitive 
document unattended, (b) inadvertently installing a virus from an e-mail attachment, (c) 
downloading unauthorized software, (d) reconfiguring a workstation’s security setting, 
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(e) disabling a firewall, (f) providing personal information, or (g) failing to protect a 
password (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006).  Insider threats may not occur as frequently as 
external attacks, but they have a higher rate of success, can go undetected, and pose a 
greater risk than an external attack (Chinchani et al., 2005).  These internal threats 
continue to pose a significant security challenge within any organization.  One way to 
lessen the impact of these security challenges is through information assurance training.  
Information assurance training not only raises users’ awareness levels but also provides 
users with the ability to recognize and prevent any inappropriate actions.  However, prior 
to conducting any security training, an organization security manager must assess the 
organization’s state of security awareness (Blyth & Kovacich, 2006). 
The purpose of this study was to assess the security behaviors and practices of 
common system users.  Previous research in assessing the security behavior of a user had 
been conducted by Katz (2005).  To measure the participants’ security behavior, Katz 
used a 5-point Likert scale in a self-administered, closed-ended quantitative 
questionnaire.  Because this study was a continuation of the work conducted by Katz, 
permission was obtained from Katz to adapt his methodology.  This adaptation included 
replacing the physical and location questions with questions regarding security training.  
Because a user’s behavior can be influenced by demographic groups, this adaptation also 
included examining the influence on the security behavior of four demographic groups: 
gender, age, education, and occupation.  This survey instrument was designed in two 
sections: the demographic section, which used a binary scale to gather the participants’ 
demographic data, and a security section, which used a 5-point Likert scale to measure 
the participants’ security behavior.   
71 
 
Eighty-seven of the 288 employees at the General Dynamic and Program Manager 
Advanced Amphibious Assault (GD & PM AAA) Facility in Woodbridge, Virginia, 
completed the survey for a return rate of 30%.  Results of this study were based on those 
completed surveys.  The participants’ responses were used to answer four demographic 
questions concerning gender, age, education, and occupation and the research question.  
The demographic data were analyzed using a t test, and the population security data were 
analyzed using the Pearson chi-square test.  To determine whether the findings were 
statistically significant for specific demographic groups and the population as a whole, a 
probability of less than 5% (p < .05) was used. 
The results for the gender demographic group were statistically significant, indicating 
that females were more security aware than their male counterparts.  The results for the 
age demographic group were also statistically significant, indicating that participants 
aged 39 or younger were more security aware than their older counterparts aged 40 or 
more.  Furthermore, for the education demographic group, the results were again 
statistically significant, indicating that participants who had not attended college were 
more security aware than their higher educated counterparts.  In addition, the results for 
the demographic group classified as to position type were statistically significant, 
indicating that participants in nontechnical positions were more security aware than those 
who were in technical positions.  Finally, the results addressing the research question 
were also statistically significant, indicating that a relation exists between users’ security 
behaviors and their levels of security awareness. 
A review of security items on the survey that received the highest and lowest scores 
for demographic groups and the total population indicated the following.  The 
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participants knew whom to contact if they received a virus alert.  However, only 40.2% 
of the participants always scanned their email attachments for viruses while 58.2% did 
not, leaving their systems vulnerable to a virus attack.  In addition, 40.6% of the 
participants never allowed others access to their system while 59.4% did so, making their 
systems or the data on their systems vulnerable to compromised.  Finally, 44.8% of the 
participants never used the automatic/save password feature on their computers while 
55.2% did use the feature, leaving their system passwords vulnerable to compromise. 
In conclusion, the results indicated that the gender, occupation, and education 
demographics confirmed the literature findings; however, the age demographic indicated 
that younger participants were more security aware, disputing the literature that stated 
that older participants were more security aware.  Although the research question 
indicated that a relation between individuals’ security behavior and their level of security 
awareness exists, the overall response rate of the sample population was 58%, indicating 
that 42% of the population was engaging in inappropriate security practices and behavior.  
These results imply that the participants are either ignoring their training by engaging in 
poor security practices or the security training provided did not raise their security-
awareness level to prevent such poor practices. 
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Student’s Name:     Gordon J. Grant    
 
Date of Submission:      26 May 2010     
 
Purpose and Title of Submission:       Dissertation Report      
 Ascertaining the Relationship between Security Awareness and the    
  Security Behavior of Individuals        
 
Certification of Authorship:  I hereby certify that I am the author of this document and 
that any assistance I received in its preparation is fully acknowledged and disclosed in the 
document.  I have also cited all sources from which I obtained data, ideas, or words that 
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From: Frank Katz [mailto:Frank.Katz@armstrong.edu]  
Sent: Monday, February 16, 2009 3:43 PM 
To: Grant, Gordon (Cont) 
Subject: Re: permission to use survey 
 
I hereby give Gordon J. Grant permission to use my paper, "The Effect of a University 
Information Security Survey on Instruction Methods in Information Security," published 
in the Digital Library of the ACM and published and presented at InfosecCD 2005, in his 
doctoral research. 
 
Sincerely, 
Frank H. Katz 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Frank H. Katz 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Information Technology 
Armstrong Atlantic State University 
912-344-3192 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
>>> "Grant, Gordon (Cont)" <gjgrant@egginc.com> 2/16/2009 3:27 PM >>> 
Prof Katz, 
 
This is a following-up, per our phone conversation today 16 Feb 09 at 3:21 PM regarding 
your granting me permission to use your survey for my dissertation. I need an email 
response to place in my dissertation. 
 
Thank you,  
 
RS 
Gordon J. Grant 
gjgrant@egginc.com 
703-445-3462 
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From: Grant, Gordon (Cont)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2008 10:51 AM 
To: 'Frank.Katz@armstrong.edu' 
Cc: Grant, Gordon (Cont) 
Subject: Permission to use survey 
Importance: High 
 
Professor Katz,  
 
My dissertation is similar to the study you conducted and presented at the InfoSecCD 
Conference in September 2005.  Instead of surveying an academic environment I will be 
surveying a research/manufacturing environment.  I am therefore requesting permission 
to use your survey as part of my dissertation.  
 
RS  
Gordon J. Grant 
PhD candidate 
Nova Southeastern University 
703-441-7071 
gjgrant@egginc.com 
grantg@nsu.nova.edu   
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Grant, Gordon (Cont)  
 
From: OBrien Maj William E  
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2008 2:48 PM  
To: Grant CTR Gordon J  
Subject: RE: Conduct PhD Survey  
 
Mr. Grant,  
 
Col Moore has authorized the Advanced Amphibious Assault program 
office to participate in your survey.  This is strictly on a 
volunteer basis and will be contained only on the government side 
to include contractors that are in direct support of government 
functions.  Your initial solicitation will be via e-mail with the 
attached survey form for individuals to print out, answer the 
questions then return to myself.  I will collect these forms then 
immediate place them in my government safe until the deadline for 
submission has passed.  I will then place the completed surveys 
into one envelope and provide them to you.  
 
I am still working the total number of personnel here that will 
be provided the opportunity to participate in your survey.  
 
r/ 
 
Maj O'Brien  
703 492 3308  
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Grant CTR Gordon J  
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 11:09 AM  
To: OBrien Maj William E  
Cc: Grant CTR Gordon J; 'gjgrant@egginc.com'  
Subject: Conduct PhD Survey  
 
Maj O'Brien 
 
As per our conversation on Thursday 7 August at the Clubs at 
Quantico enclosed is what we discussed.  
 
I am a contractor supporting System Engineering (SE) and a PhD 
student at Nova Southeastern University (NSU).  The purpose of my 
dissertation is to evaluate the information security behavior of 
individuals.  The intent is to take a snapshot of the current 
information assurance awareness practices of the common user 
within PM AAA and General Dynamics facility.  The results of this 
survey will provide academic and security community with a means 
of assessing and developing better ways in preventing security 
threats.  
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To do this I would like to e-mail my survey to everyone in the 
command intranet.  Because this research is with human subjects 
prior to being able to submit my survey it will have to be 
reviewed and approved by PM AAA and my schools (NSU) 
Institutional Review Board (IRB).  If PM AAA has an IRB 
representative they would also have to review the survey prior to 
submission.  
 
I am therefore requesting permission to conduct my survey via the 
PM AAA intranet.  
 
Enclosed is a copy of the survey for your review. If there are 
any questions or problems feel free to contact me.  
 
RS  
Gordon Grant  
Principal System Engineer  
Alion Science & Technology/EG&G CEOss Team  
703-441-7071  
gjgrant@egginc.com  
grantgj.ctr@efv.usmc.mil  
ggrant@alionscience.com  
 
 
Note: (FYI)  
The IRB is a federal regulation that protects the rights and 
privacy of human subjects involved in research activities.  The 
National Research Act Public Law 99-158, the Health Research 
Extension Act of 9185, and the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research provide guidelines for research with human subjects to 
ensure their protection in the design and conduct of research.  
These federal regulations require that any institution requesting 
and receiving funds from a federal department or agency for 
research involving human subjects must assure that such research 
is reviewed and approved by the institution's IRB.  
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NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY  
Office of Grants and Contracts  
Institutional Review Board  
 
MEMORANDUM  
 
To:  Gordon Grant   
   
From:  Ling Wang, Ph.D.  
Institutional Review Board  
 
   
Date:  Jan. 29, 2009   
 
Re: Ascertaining the Relationship between Security Awareness and the Security 
Behavior of Individuals  
 
IRB Approval Number:  wang11150801 
 
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level.  Based on the 
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB 
review.  You may proceed with your study as described to the IRB.  As principal 
investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements:  
 
1) CONSENT:  If recruitment procedures include consent forms these must be 
obtained in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the 
process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers 
from those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider 
their participation after they have been provided this information.  The subjects 
must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed 
in a secure file separate from de-identified participant information.  Record of 
informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from the 
conclusion of the study.  
2) ADVERSE REACTIONS:  The principal investigator is required to notify the 
IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and 954-262-2020 respectively) of any adverse 
reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this study.  
Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, depression as a 
result of participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of 
confidentiality/anonymity of subject.  Approval may be withdrawn if the problem 
is serious.  
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3) AMENDMENTS:  Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of 
subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to 
implementation.  Please be advised that changes in a study may require further 
review depending on the nature of the change.  Please contact me with any 
questions regarding amendments or changes to your study.  
The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human 
subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46) 
revised June 18, 1991.  
 
Cc: Protocol File  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3301 College Avenue  Fort Lauderdale, FL  33314-7796  (954) 262-5369  
Fax: (954) 262-3977  E-mail: inga@nsu.nova.edu  Web site: www.nova.edu/cwis/ogc 
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INFORMATION ASSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
 
My name is Gordon Grant and I am a PhD candidate at Nova Southeastern 
University (NSU) Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences.  By 
completing this survey you will assist me with my dissertation which is dedicated in 
evaluating information assurance practices.  The intent of this survey is to take a snapshot 
of the current information assurance practices within your organization.  The results of 
this survey will provide academic and security researchers with the means of assessing 
and developing better ways in preventing unintentional security threats that can lead to 
identity theft.  
 
This survey is constructed in two sections: demographics (section-1), and security 
(section-2).  This survey should only take 2 minutes to complete.  In keeping with NSU 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements, at no time will any identifying 
information be asked of you or be given out.  All information provided will be kept 
strictly confidential and any identifying information on the questionnaire will be 
discarded upon receipt.  The results of this survey will be presented as percentages or 
graphs.  
 
Please answer each question candidly and submit the completed survey with this cover 
sheet to the Operations Officer (Major O’Brien).  Refer all questions to: 
grantg@nsu.nova.edu or gjgrant@egginc.com  
 
 
Consent statement:  
         [ ]   I consent to participate in this study. 
(please check)  
 
 
Thank you for your assistance.  
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SECTION – 1  
DEMOGRAPHICS  
 
 
Instructions:  
1. This section will gather demographic information (e.g., gender, age, education, 
and occupation) from each participant which will be used to set up the variables 
for the statistical analysis.  
2. Please place an ―X‖ in the appropriate column box located to the right of the 
question.  
 
Explanation of the questions:  
1. Question 1: self explanatory  
2. Question 2: self explanatory  
3. Question 3: a ―Yes‖ indicates that you attended or received a college diploma or 
degree  
4. Question 4: self explanatory  
 
 
Please check the box that describes you:  
 Yes No 
1. Are you a female?   
2. Are you age 40 and over?    
3. Are you a college graduate?   
4. Are you in a technical position?   
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SECTION – 2  
SECURITY QUESTIONS  
 
 
Instructions:  
 
1. Please read through the following explanations to understand each choice on the 
questionnaire.  
a. Always is when you perform the action all the time  
b. Sometimes is when you performed the action several times a week  
c. Neutral is when you do not understand the question, you are unsure about 
how to answer the question, the question does not apply or you do not 
want to answer the question  
d. Seldom is when you performed the action once a month  
e. Never you do not performed this action  
 
2. Then place an ―X‖ in the box to the right of the question that most closely 
describes your actions.  
 
3. Remember to answer every question candidly.  There are no ―right‖ or ―wrong‖ 
answers, this survey is to get a better idea on current computer security practices.  
 
4. All information will be kept confidential; any identifying information will be 
discarded upon receipt.  
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Section – 2  
SECURITY QUESTIONS  
 
 
Please check the appropriate box that most closely describes your actions:  
 Always Sometime Neutral Seldo
m 
Never 
1. Do you participate in security training?       
2. Do you know who to contact if you get 
a virus alert?  
     
3. Do you lock your screen or use a 
screensaver when you leave your 
computer?  
     
4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for 
viruses?  
     
5. Do you use the automatic 
save/remember password feature on your 
computer?  
     
6. Do other people have access or use of 
your computer?  
     
7. Do you download anything from the 
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, 
video clips, etc.)?  
     
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey.  
 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire to Major O’Brien  
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Appendix F 
 
Raw Data  
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Raw Data  
Section-1 Demographics Questionnaire  
 
 
Table F1. Demographic Responses.  
1. Gender Yes No 
Are you a female?  20 67 
 
2. Age Yes No 
Are you age 40 and over?  53 34 
 
3. Education Yes No 
Are you a college graduate?  65 22 
 
4. Occupation Yes No 
Are you in a technical position?  56 31 
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Raw Data  
Section-2 Security Questionnaire  
 
 
Table F2. Security Responses by Sample Population.  
 Always Sometime Neutral Seldo
m 
Never 
1. Do you participate in security training?  61 10 5 9 2 
      
2. Do you know who to contact if you get 
a virus alert?  
79 3 2 0 3 
      
3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen 
saver when you leave your computer?  
57 26 1 2 1 
      
4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for 
viruses?  
35 9 11 12 20 
      
5. Do you use the automatic 
save/remember password feature on your 
computer?  
9 19 5 15 39 
      
6. Do other people have access or use of 
your computer?  
7 16 6 18 40 
      
7. Do you download anything from the 
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, 
video clips, etc.)?  
0 20 1 24 42 
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Table F3. Security Responses by Gender (Female/Male).  
 Always Sometime Neutral Seldo
m 
Never 
1. Do you participate in security training?       
Female 14 2 2 2 0 
Male 47 8 3 7 2 
2. Do you know who to contact if you get 
a virus alert?  
     
Female 18 0 1 0 1 
Male 61 3 1 0 2 
3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen 
saver when you leave your computer?  
     
Female 13 7 0 0 0 
Male 44 19 1 2 1 
4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for 
viruses?  
     
Female 10 2 1 1 6 
Male 25 7 10 11 14 
5. Do you use the automatic 
save/remember password feature on your 
computer?  
     
Female 3 4 0 4 9 
Male 6 15 5 11 30 
6. Do other people have access or use of 
your computer?  
     
Female 2 2 0 9 7 
Male 5 14 6 9 33 
7. Do you download anything from the 
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, 
video clips, etc.)?  
     
Female 0 5 0 3 12 
Male 0 15 1 21 30 
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Table F4. Security Responses by Age (40 & over/39 & under).  
 Always Sometime Neutral Seldo
m 
Never 
1. Do you participate in security training?       
Age 40 & Over 39 4 5 3 2 
Age 39 & Under 22 6 0 6 0 
2. Do you know who to contact if you get 
a virus alert?  
     
Age 40 & Over 48 2 2 0 1 
Age 39 & Under 31 1 0 0 2 
3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen 
saver when you leave your computer?  
     
Age 40 & Over  34 17 1 0 1 
Age 39 & Under 23 9 0 2 0 
4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for 
viruses?  
     
Age 40 & Over  20 5 6 8 14 
Age 39 & Under 15 4 5 4 6 
5. Do you use the automatic 
save/remember password feature on your 
computer?  
     
Age 40 & Over  8 13 2 8 22 
Age 39 & Under 1 6 3 7 17 
6. Do other people have access or use of 
your computer?  
     
Age 40 & Over  4 12 3 14 20 
Age 39 & Under 3 4 3 4 20 
7. Do you download anything from the 
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, 
video clips, etc.)?  
     
Age 40 & Over  0 14 1 13 25 
Age 39 & Under 0 6 0 11 17 
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Table F5. Security Responses by Education (College/No-College).  
 Always Sometime Neutral Seldo
m 
Never 
1. Do you participate in security training?        
College 45 6 5 8 1 
No-College 16 4 0 1 1 
2. Do you know who to contact if you get 
a virus alert?  
     
College  59 2 2 0 2 
No-College 20 1 0 0 1 
3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen 
saver when you leave your computer?  
     
College 40 21 1 2 1 
No-College 17 5 0 0 0 
4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for 
viruses?  
     
College  25 6 7 10 17 
No-College 10 3 4 2 3 
5. Do you use the automatic 
save/remember password feature on your 
computer?  
     
College  9 17 1 14 24 
No-College 0 2 4 1 15 
6. Do other people have access or use of 
your computer?  
     
College  4 11 6 11 33 
No-College 3 5 0 7 7 
7. Do you download anything from the 
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, 
video clips, etc.)?  
     
College  0 14 1 20 30 
No-College 0 6 0 4 12 
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Table F6. Security Responses by Occupation (Technical/Nontechnical).  
 Always Sometime Neutral Seldo
m 
Never 
1. Do you participate in security training?       
Technical 36 7 5 6 2 
Nontechnical 25 3 0 3 0 
2. Do you know who to contact if you get 
a virus alert?  
     
Technical 53 1 1 0 1 
Nontechnical 26 2 1 0 2 
3. Do you lock your screen or use a screen 
saver when you leave your computer?  
     
Technical 36 17 1 1 1 
Nontechnical 21 9 0 1 0 
4. Do you scan all e-mail attachments for 
viruses?  
     
Technical 22 5 10 8 11 
Nontechnical 13 4 1 4 9 
5. Do you use the automatic 
save/remember password feature on your 
computer?  
     
Technical 5 16 2 8 25 
Nontechnical 4 3 3 7 14 
6. Do other people have access or use of 
your computer?  
     
Technical 5 11 5 14 21 
Nontechnical 2 5 1 4 19 
7. Do you download anything from the 
web (e.g., applications, upgrades, music, 
video clips, etc.)?  
     
Technical 0 13 1 17 25 
Nontechnical 0 7 0 7 17 
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